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and Leon Moonen, Member, IEEE Computer Society 
Abstract—Context. In many application domains, critical systems must comply with safety standards. This involves gathering 
safety evidence in the form of artefacts such as safety analyses, system specifications, and testing results. These artefacts can 
evolve during a system’s lifecycle, creating a need for change impact analysis to guarantee that system safety and compliance 
are not jeopardised. Objective. We aim to provide new insights into how safety evidence change impact analysis is addressed in 
practice. The knowledge about this activity is limited despite the extensive research that has been conducted on change impact 
analysis and on safety evidence management. Method. We conducted an industrial survey on the circumstances under which 
safety evidence change impact analysis is addressed, the tool support used, and the challenges faced. Results. We obtained 97 
valid responses representing 16 application domains, 28 countries, and 47 safety standards. The respondents had most often 
performed safety evidence change impact analysis during system development, from system specifications, and fully manually. 
No commercial change impact analysis tool was reported as used for all artefact types and insufficient tool support was the 
most frequent challenge. Conclusion. The results suggest that the different artefact types used as safety evidence co-evolve. In 
addition, the evolution of safety cases should probably be better managed, the level of automation in safety evidence change 
impact analysis is low, and the state of the practice can benefit from over 20 improvement areas. 
Index Terms—Safety-critical System, Safety Evidence, Change Impact Analysis, State of the Practice, Survey Research 
——————————   u   —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
OCIETY increasingly depends on complex computer-
based and software-intensive systems. They penetrate 
many aspects of our daily life, such as transport, energy, 
and healthcare, and their malfunction can have consider-
ably negative consequences. Many of these systems are 
safety-critical and subject to some form of safety assess-
ment by a third party (e.g., a certification authority) in 
order to ensure that the systems do not pose undue risks 
to people, property, or the environment. This includes an 
analysis of how software contributes to system safety and 
of software safety risks. A common type of assessment is 
compliance with safety (or safety-related) standards, usu-
ally referred to as safety certification [23]. Examples of 
safety standards used in industry include IEC 61508 for 
electrical, electronic, and programmable electronic sys-
tems in a wide range of industries, and more specific 
standards such as DO-178C for avionics, the CENELEC 
standards for railway (e.g., EN 50128), and ISO 26262 for 
the automotive sector [48]. 
Demonstrating compliance with a specific standard in-
volves gathering and providing convincing safety evi-
dence [35], defined as artefacts that contribute to gaining 
confidence in the safe operation of a system and that are 
used to show the fulfilment of the criteria of a safety 
standard [48]. Examples of artefact types that can be used 
as safety evidence include safety analysis results, system 
specifications, testing results, reviews, and source code. 
Many of the artefacts used as safety evidence evolve 
during a system’s lifecycle, including software artefacts. 
As a consequence, the corresponding changes must be 
managed and impact analysis might be necessary in order 
to guarantee that the changes do not jeopardise system 
safety or compliance with a standard [26]. In software 
engineering, impact analysis can be defined as the activity 
that aims at identifying the potential consequences of a 
change in some software product [4]. By Safety Evidence 
Change Impact Analysis (SECIA), we refer to the activity 
that attempts to identify the potential consequences of a 
change in the body of safety evidence [46], [51]. This body 
constitutes the collection of artefacts managed as safety 
evidence for a system, usually a large set of artefacts that 
is difficult to overview. Possible consequences of a change 
can be the need for adding, modifying, or revoking safety 
evidence artefacts. Changes during system development, 
system modification and re-certification, and component 
reuse are examples of situations in which SECIA can be 
necessary [12]. 
Change impact analysis (hereafter referred to as impact 
analysis) is a crucial activity in the lifecycle of any safety-
critical system. Indeed, it is prescribed in most of the safe-
ty standards used in industry, e.g. [10], [26], [45], [58]. 
However, the standards do not explain in detail how to 
perform an impact analysis, but just provide general 
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guidance [13], [28]. In some cases, the standards do not 
even clearly state when impact analysis should be per-
formed. This lack of clarity can lead to an inadequately 
performed analysis resulting in overlooked impact. Ex-
amples of accidents, or near-accidents, because of inade-
quate impact analysis can be found in practically every 
application domain, e.g. [24], [28], [29], [37], [68], from 
classical examples such as the Ariane 5 accident to recent 
airplane crashes. 
Although safety evidence management and impact 
analysis are two research areas that have received signifi-
cant attention in the last decades, previous research barely 
reflects on the state of the practice. The number of publi-
cations that report insights into how practitioners deal 
with these activities is low [36], [47], and there is a lack of 
publications that study how industry addresses SECIA. 
Previous studies focused on specific practices related to a 
reduced set of companies (e.g., the partners of a specific 
project [50]), standards (e.g., only IEC 61511 [5]), domains 
(e.g., automotive [16]), or artefact types (e.g., require-
ments and test cases specifications [2]). Therefore, a com-
prehensive picture of current SECIA practices does not 
exist. Without this knowledge, it is difficult to effectively 
determine industry needs and to shape future research 
towards them. 
This paper presents a survey aimed at gaining insights 
into how SECIA is addressed in practice. We designed a 
web-based questionnaire targeted at practitioners that 
were or had been involved in SECIA. This includes peo-
ple who provide, check, or request safety evidence. We 
asked questions about the circumstances under which 
SECIA was addressed, the tool support used, and the 
challenges faced. We obtained 97 valid responses from 16 
application domains, 28 countries, 47 safety standards, 
nine types of organizations, and five overall roles.  
To the best of our knowledge, this survey is the largest 
empirical study, to date, concerning the state of the prac-
tice on safety evidence management and on impact analy-
sis for safety-critical systems. Therefore, this work pro-
vides strong empirical evidence on SECIA practices that 
should help academia to identify areas in which further 
research is necessary. Practitioners can benefit by gaining 
new insights into how they can or should deal with 
SECIA, and use the survey results as a benchmark for 
their own practices. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
reviews related work. Section 3 describes the research 
method. Section 4 presents the results and our interpreta-
tion. Section 5 summarises our conclusions. Appendices A 
to D provide the supplemental material of the paper. 
2 RELATED WORK 
Related work is divided into general literature on impact 
analysis, whose insights can apply to safety evidence, and 
specific literature on impact analysis for safety-critical 
systems. Related work indicates artefact types that might 
be involved in SECIA, possible tool support and its char-
acteristics, and possible challenges. Special attention is 
given to publications that have provided insights into the 
state of the practice on impact analysis and SECIA.  
Fig. 1 presents the main concepts of the survey and 
thus of the review of related work, and the relationships 
between them. The figure aims to facilitate paper under-
standing. Appendix A (survey questionnaire) includes 
definitions and examples of the artefact types. The rest of 
concepts are introduced in this or the previous section. 
2.1 General Literature on Impact Analysis 
Impact analysis has been the subject of extensive research 
for the last four decades, especially in the context of soft-
ware evolution and software maintenance [4].  
Most research on impact analysis has focused on 
source code [36], studying both change effects between 
source code artefacts and on other artefact types (e.g., test 
cases to re-execute after a change). Another area that has 
received significant attention is impact analysis for re-
quirements, especially during requirements management 
and traceability [30]. Impact analysis for architecture 
specifications [27], software components [70], or test cases 
[2] has also been frequently investigated. 
Carrillo-de-Gea et al. analysed requirements manage-
ment tools and their support for requirements change 
management [9]. Li et al. assessed the state of tooling for 
impact analysis on source code [38], and report that most 
tools are academic prototypes and that only JRipples 
seems to be stable and mature.  
According to Jamshidi et al. [27], most of the research 
on architecture-centric software evolution provides im-
pact analysis tool support, at times with full automation. 
The literature also reports on the extension and adapta-
tion of commercial tools for impact analysis purposes 
[67]. Regarding the current approaches for automated 
traceability and impact analysis, they have been validated 
on small data sets [7] and limited artefact types [49]. 
Therefore, their actual support to industrial needs re-
mains unconfirmed because practitioners usually have to 
deal with tens of artefact types and thousands of artefacts 
for SECIA [48]. Buckley et al. suggest that some manual 
work is always necessary for impact analysis [8]. 
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  Fig. 1. SECIA conceptual model 
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The state of the practice in software impact analysis is 
reported in several publications. Goeritzer conducted a 
case study in industry and report that most software en-
gineers manually perform impact analysis on source code 
and would like to have further tool assistance [21]. Tao et 
al. focused on how software engineers understand soft-
ware source code changes [64]. This study reports the 
need for more tool support and the difficulty in determin-
ing (1) the completeness and consistency of a change and 
(2) the effect on other software components. Babar et al. 
conducted a survey on the usefulness of design rationales 
for software maintenance and conclude that documenting 
the rationale can facilitate the identification of the ele-
ments impacted by a change [1]. Rovegård et al. inter-
viewed software engineers and report impact analysis 
challenges related to the lack of resources, the need for 
experience and expertise, inadequate traceability, insuffi-
cient tool support, and the need for more structured in-
formation [57]. They suggest a number of improvement 
areas, which include arranging meetings to discuss im-
pact analysis and introducing tool and method support. 
A recent survey on requirements volatility indicates 
that requirements changes have recurring nature and 
evaluating their consequences can be complex and time-
consuming [18]. Other authors have reported challenges 
related to requirements change impact, such as the need 
for having several development roles involved to proper-
ly understand the impact [71] and difficulties in accurate-
ly predicting change management cost [39]. Challenges in 
tracing requirements and test cases and in maintaining 
alignment between them have been identified in a survey 
of six companies [2].  
2.2 Impact Analysis for Safety-Critical Systems 
Publications focusing on impact analysis for safety-critical 
systems have dealt with the evolution of safety-targeted 
artefact types (e.g., safety cases), tool support, and safety-
specific concerns and challenges in system evolution. 
Safety cases are arguably among the main evidence 
types for a safety-critical system. They are a documented 
argument aimed at providing a compelling, comprehen-
sive, and valid case that a system is acceptably safe for a 
given application in a given operating environment [32]. 
Safety cases can be provided in only text or also with 
structured graphical representations in order to more 
clearly show how evidence supports the main arguments 
about the truth of a system’s safety claims [47]. These 
safety arguments are typically based on the measures 
taken for ensuring that technical safety risks have been 
mitigated or avoided. The evolutionary nature of safety 
cases has been discussed in previous works such as [32], 
[44], [63], which indicate that safety arguments should 
evolve and be created incrementally as system develop-
ment progresses.  
Conducting SECIA using safety cases can be very chal-
lenging because they typically contain hundreds of refer-
ences to other artefacts for supporting their safety argu-
ments, and these artefacts evolve during a system’s 
lifecycle. Prior work studied the evolution of safety anal-
yses and assessments [40] and the possible impact of ar-
chitectural changes in safety cases [3]. Recent models for 
safety certification explicitly address SECIA needs (e.g., 
[13]), such as the specification of the effects that a change 
in an artefact type can have in other types. 
According to Lloyd and Reeve [41], widely available 
tools can facilitate impact analysis of safety-critical sys-
tems, and change management can be tracked with work-
flow tools or wikis. The authors also argue for the suita-
bility of manual procedures. However, we conjecture that 
such procedures will be too time-consuming and error-
prone, and can have problems of scalability. ASCE and 
Reqtify are examples of commercial tools that have been 
referred to in the SECIA literature [35], [44], where Reqtify 
was used only in an avionics hardware development 
project.  
An important aspect regarding tool support is tool 
qualification [35], a formal assurance of output suitability. 
In many domains, the artefacts that a tool produces dur-
ing a safety-critical system’s lifecycle need to be formally 
reviewed unless the tool is qualified, including SECIA 
tools. In this sense, tools can be regarded as safety-critical 
because their malfunction can lead to safety risks. As an 
example, Reqtify is formally qualified for avionics and 
railway. 
A survey with 52 practitioners [48] precedes our cur-
rent study. The previous survey studied general safety 
evidence management practices regarding the infor-
mation provided as evidence, evidence change manage-
ment, structuring of evidence, evidence adequacy as-
sessment, and challenges in evidence provision.  
To better understand change management, the previ-
ous survey asked how the effect on other pieces of evi-
dence was checked when a piece changed and whether 
details about how the change of a piece of evidence had 
affected others were managed. These aspects overlap with 
and are studied in more depth in this paper. The survey 
also asked how the degree of evidence completeness was 
checked and how traceability between different pieces of 
evidence was recorded. 
The previous survey suggests that evidence change 
management is mainly performed manually and high-
lights the need for further analyses. Whereas the previous 
survey investigated general aspects of change manage-
ment for safety evidence, the current study describes a 
completely new survey that was conducted to explore 
specific artefact types in depth. In addition, the current 
study provides novel insights into SECIA-specific situa-
tions, challenges, and tool support. Finally, the population 
of the survey reported in this paper is a subset of the 
population for [48]: practitioners involved in safety evi-
dence management in general vs. practitioners involved 
in SECIA, a part of safety evidence management.  
Surveys among the partners of industry-academia re-
search projects [50], [59] have reported tools for the de-
velopment and assurance of safety-critical systems suita-
ble for impact analysis and change management purposes 
(e.g., Reqtify and VectorCAST). Although their contribu-
tions are valuable, these surveys focus on safety evidence 
management in general, and not on, for instance, how 
often different artefact types trigger SECIA. An interview 
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study with engineers from four companies in different 
application domains [53] reports on the execution of safe-
ty analysis activities after requirements changes and on 
the need for allocating sufficient resources to handle 
change and for awareness of change impact on system 
safety. 
Other authors have analysed information from previ-
ous projects to study impact analysis for safety-critical 
systems. Borg et al. analysed over 10,000 impact analysis 
reports from a company in the power and automation 
domain [5]. The authors identified both source code and 
other artefact types (e.g., requirements, design specifica-
tions, and test cases) involved in source code impact 
analysis in the past.  
Case studies in the automotive domain indicate the 
advantages of adequate architecture structures for guid-
ing impact analysis [16], challenges for change manage-
ment in relation to tool support and to systematic testing 
procedures [31], and the use of safety cases as an impact 
analysis tool in system changes and with respect to sys-
tem safety [65]. In the medical domain, problems related 
to traceability (e.g., unclear trace granularity) have been 
reported [42], as well as previous system failures and 
issues such as incomplete impact analysis and insufficient 
verification and validation (V&V) after changes [68]. 
Other identified challenges in impact analysis for safe-
ty-critical systems include: the impact of component reuse 
and evolution on safety [14], determining if a component 
can be reused [25], the vast amount of artefacts to trace 
and the need for safety assessors’ confidence [46], the 
need for planning and documenting impact analysis [55], 
and the difficulty in ensuring system safety after a change 
[66]. 
To summarize, the main differences between our sur-
vey and related work are as follows: 
1) Prior SECIA-related empirical studies have dealt 
with a reduced number of application domains, 
countries, and safety standards. 
2) Previous research has acknowledged the existence 
of many phenomena (e.g., artefact types involved 
in impact analysis or challenges faced by practi-
tioners), but does not provide insights into how of-
ten the phenomena occur in SECIA. 
3) Most prior work has only studied single or a re-
duced number of artefact types (e.g., source code). 
4) Very little information exists about the tools used 
for SECIA in industry, and this information is prac-
tically non-existence for particular artefact types 
(e.g., assumptions and operation conditions). 
We have used observations in related work for creating 
the survey questionnaire (see Section 3.2) and discussing 
the results (Section 4). We also use the lack of information 
in related work for result discussion. 
3 RESEARCH METHOD 
We utilized the survey approach and employed a web-
based questionnaire because of the following main ad-
vantages [17], [48], [54], [62]: 
1) They allow us to understand the views of many 
individuals that work in different companies or 
industries in a unified way 
2) They support data collection for many variables in 
a short time 
3) They offer unified data collection framed by sur-
vey questions 
4) They bring the potential of collecting a larger 
number of responses than with interviews 
5) When compared to interviewing practitioners in 
our industry network, a wider and more heteroge-
neous sample can be reached by advertising the 
survey in different industry-oriented forums 
Prior work delivers limited understanding of how 
SECIA is handled in practice. The available theories 
around SECIA are either partial for some phenomena or 
inexistent for other phenomena. For example, there is 
evidence that SECIA can be performed when a compo-
nent is reused but not of how often it happens, and there 
is no evidence of the level of automation of SECIA from 
manual V&V results. To address this gap, we designed an 
exploratory survey aimed at investigating how SECIA is 
performed within its industrial context and at seeking 
new insights, ideas, and possible hypotheses for future 
research [56]. We collected and analysed both quantitative 
and qualitative data provided by practitioners via a self-
administered questionnaire.  
We used the recommendations on surveys in software 
engineering research by Kitchenham and Pfleeger [34] as 
the main basis for defining and executing the research 
process. Some adaptation was necessary because of as-
pects specific to this survey, such as the analysis of free-
text questions and the use of a social network for sam-
pling. 
The following subsections present the research ques-
tions, survey design, instrument evaluation, data collec-
tion, data analysis, and validity. Further details about the 
research method can be found in [11]. 
3.1 Research Questions 
The goal of the survey was to gain insights into how indus-
try deals with SECIA. As explained in Section 2.2, aspects 
that characterise how SECIA is addressed include when it is 
performed (e.g., for component reuse), the artefact types 
involved, the tool support used and the level of automation 
that it offers, and the challenges faced. The goal was decom-
posed into the following Research Questions (RQs). 
RQ1. Under what circumstances is safety evidence change 
impact analysis addressed? 
RQ1.1. How often do these circumstances occur? 
The purpose of RQ1 and subsequent RQ1.1 is to explore 
the circumstances during a system’s lifecycle when SECIA is 
actually conducted (general situations, and SECIA from and 
on specific artefact types), and how often these circumstanc-
es occur. For example, system re-certification is acknowl-
edged as a situation in which evidence evolves and thus 
SECIA might be necessary [12]. However, the information 
about the frequency of this situation in industry has not been 
provided. Moreover, we aimed to study the artefact types 
that trigger SECIA and the artefact types affected by the 
changes. To the best of our knowledge, no publication has 
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studied a large range of artefact types that can be involved in 
SECIA, or if some artefact types trigger SECIA more often 
than others. 
RQ2. What tool support for safety evidence change impact 
analysis is currently used? 
The purpose of RQ2 is to collect the information about the 
current level of automation for SECIA and the tools currently 
used by industry. Such tools include those used for storing 
evidence of safety evidence change management. There is 
little knowledge about SECIA supporting tools in relation to, 
for instance, safety cases. We have found only ASCE in the 
literature [44], but without evidence of use in practice, see 
Section 2.2 for details. 
RQ3. What challenges are faced when dealing with safety 
evidence change impact analysis? 
RQ3.1. How often are the challenges faced? 
RQ3.2 How could safety evidence change impact analy-
sis be improved? 
The purpose of RQ3 is to explore the current issues in in-
dustry regarding SECIA. Many different SECIA challenges 
are acknowledged in the literature (see Section 2.2 for de-
tails), but there exists no in-depth study yet on how often 
practitioners face them and how practitioners consider that 
state-of-practice SECIA could be improved. 
We acknowledge that further phenomena can be studied 
to gain insights into how industry deals with SECIA, such as 
the activities executed and the roles involved. In this survey, 
designed according to an expected completion time of 20 
minutes (see Section 3.2), we decided to prioritise the above 
RQs. 
3.2 Survey Design 
We designed a structured cross-sectional web-based survey 
[34], aimed at obtaining information from the participants at 
a fixed point in time based on their previous experience in 
dealing with SECIA. We used SurveyMonkey 
(https://www.surveymonkey.net) as supporting tool. Ap-
pendix A contains the final questionnaire. 
The survey was targeted at practitioners that were or had 
been involved in SECIA. This included people who provid-
ed safety evidence (e.g., safety engineers or testers of a com-
pany that supplies components), people who checked safety 
evidence (e.g., an independent safety assessor), and people 
who requested safety evidence (e.g., a person that represents 
a certification authority). These professionals correspond to 
the target population. To ensure that we obtained valid in-
formation about practice, we explicitly provided this charac-
terisation of the target population as well as the definition of 
SECIA in the introduction of the questionnaire. We also 
gathered the level of experience in SECIA (number of pro-
jects and years; Q7 and Q8), and asked about how often 
certain phenomena had happened (i.e., in how many pro-
jects; e.g., in Q9). Section 4 provides further details about the 
roles of the organizations and of the respondents of the sur-
vey sample. 
The questionnaire was created taking related work into 
consideration. We adopted and adapted information in rela-
tion to: 
• Respondents’ background [48] (Q2-Q8);  
• SECIA situations [12] (Q9); 
• Artefact types that can be used as safety evidence  
(Q11, Q13, Q15 and Q17), by synthesising and se-
lecting artefact types from a taxonomy of safety 
evidence [48] (from 70 to 14 artefact types; e.g., 
Manual V&V Results as a generalisation of Inspec-
tion Results and Review Results)  
• Likert scales on frequency [61] (Q9, Q11, Q13, and 
Q20);  
• Levels of automation [52] (Q15), and; 
• Challenges in impact analysis and SECIA (Q20): 
o Difficulty in estimating the effort required to 
manage a change (e.g., [14]); 
o Too coarse granularity of the traceability be-
tween artefacts to accurately know the con-
sequences of a change (e.g., [18]) 
o Excessive detail of the traceability between 
artefacts, making traceability management 
more complex than necessary for impact 
analysis purposes (e.g., [25]) 
o Unclear meaning of the traceability between 
artefacts in order to know how to manage a 
change (e.g., [42]) 
o Insufficient traceability between artefacts to 
accurately know the consequences of a 
change (e.g., [46]) 
o Long time for evaluating the consequences 
of a change (e.g., [46]) 
o Insufficient confidence by assessor or certifi-
ers in having managed a change properly 
(e.g., [46]) 
o Vast number of artefacts to trace (e.g., [48]) 
o Insufficient tool support (e.g., [48]) 
o Lack of a systematic process for performing 
impact analysis (e.g., [49]) 
o Difficulty in determining the effect of a 
change on system safety (e.g., [49]) 
o Difficulty in deciding if a component can be 
reused (e.g., [57]) 
o Difficulty in assessing system-level impact 
of component reuse (e.g., [66]) 
The pages and the options of the questions were present-
ed in a randomized order to mitigate threats to validity, 
particularly errors and omissions due to respondents' fa-
tigue. Definitions and clarifications were provided for those 
parts of the questionnaire in which the risk of misinterpreta-
tions was identified. For example, we provided examples of 
the artefact types used as safety evidence the first time they 
appeared in a questionnaire page. Respondents were given 
the possibility to mention other options in the questions.  
3.3 Instrument Evaluation 
We evaluated the survey questions in two stages (i.e., with 
two pilots). First, we invited two senior software engineering 
researchers (one of them with experience in safety-critical 
systems) and one safety-critical system developer to read the 
questionnaire and provide feedback on its readability, un-
derstandability, potential ambiguities, and length. The feed-
back led to the removal of four questions and to improving 
several (e.g., adding an explanation about internal tools in 
Q17 and allowing respondents to indicate “I don’t know” in 
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Q11). Second, we requested one safety assessor, one safety 
assurance manager, and one safety-critical system developer 
to complete the revised version of the questionnaire and to 
provide feedback on the same points. This evaluation result-
ed in the removal of two questions and in some minor clari-
fications. 
The final version of the questionnaire consisted of 23 
questions and it was estimated to require maximum 20 
minutes to complete.  
3.4 Data Collection 
Data collection started on November 21st of 2013 and fin-
ished on January 11th of 2014.  We advertised the survey on 
several LinkedIn groups related to safety-critical systems. 
Some groups were on specific application domains (e.g., 
automotive), some on specific safety standards (e.g., IEC 
61508), and others on more general subjects (e.g., functional 
safety). The complete list of groups can be found in [11]. This 
advertisement was aimed at reaching a large number of 
practitioners of the target population (see Section 3.2) 
worldwide, and with different backgrounds. Two reminders 
were posted on each group. The benefits of using LinkedIn 
have been discussed in the literature (e.g., [15]), and include 
the increase in subjects’ heterogeneity, the increase in the 
level of confidence in the representativeness of a sample, and 
the possibility of reaching a population for which no central-
ized bodies of professionals exist. 
In addition, we advertised the survey on two mailing lists 
on safety-critical systems (general-opencoss@listserver.tue.nl 
and systemsafety@lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de). We knew 
that some members of the lists were part of the target popu-
lation. This second advertisement aimed to complement the 
social network advertisement, since we could not know how 
many practitioners would regularly check the updates on 
LinkedIn. One reminder was posted on each mailing list. 
Finally, we contacted practitioners that we personally 
knew and participants of the prior survey [48] that agreed 
upon being contacted for follow-up studies. In both cases, 
we asked the practitioners to forward the invitation to addi-
tional relevant colleagues. We sent one reminder to the prac-
titioners that we personally knew. 
Regarding the size of the population, we refrain from 
providing an estimate because we could not sufficiently 
substantiate it. Even if we use the number of members of the 
LinkedIn groups and the mailing lists as a basis, we cannot 
accurately estimate the number of members involved in 
SECIA. The groups and the lists are on topics more general 
than SECIA (e.g., functional safety) and some people might 
be members of multiple LinkedIn groups. 
3.5 Data Analysis 
We obtained 129 responses, and rejected 28 of those because 
the respondents only completed the background infor-
mation. We examined the remaining 101 responses to detect 
careless responses [43] that should be rejected. Responses 
were considered careless if they fulfilled one of the following 
criteria: (a) the response did not provide relevant infor-
mation (e.g., the respondent only indicated “I don’t know” 
to all the questions answered); (b) the response contained 
clear and significant inconsistencies (e.g., between Q9 and 
Q11), or; (c) the response displayed patterns for which we 
could not find a justification (e.g., selection of “always” for 
all the options of the questions about the frequency of some 
phenomenon in Q9).  
The final number of valid responses was 97 (75.2% of all 
responses), including incomplete but non-careless responses, 
as long as they provided answers to some RQs. The re-
spondents that completed the whole questionnaire, and that 
in our opinion did not make any interruptions (less than 40 
minutes of completion time), needed 20 minutes and 47 
seconds on average. 
Afterwards, we reviewed the free-text responses. We uni-
fied some answers so that they had the same format. For 
example, DO-178 was referred to in different ways (e.g., 
DO178). We conducted open coding on the answers to the 
question about the respondents’ role (Q6) and to another 
about how they think that SECIA could be improved (Q22). 
This resulted in the iterative creation of a classification for 
the two questions. For example, a respondent indicated 
“software designer and architect” as his role, which was 
classified first as software engineer and finally as engineer, 
and another respondent indicated “section manager for 
hardware development”, which was classified first as prod-
uct manager and finally as manager [11]. We provide details 
about the coding on how SECIA could be improved in Sec-
tion 4. 
The first author conducted the initial unification and cod-
ing of answers. The third author validated the outcome from 
answer unification and coding of respondents’ role. For the 
answers on how to improve SECIA, the second author cod-
ed them with the codes defined by the first author in the 
first, initial open coding iteration. They then discussed the 
answers to which different codes had been assigned and the 
possibility of adjusting the codes and their definitions. The 
codes and their definitions were refined, and then the first 
author revised the coding scheme. The second author re-
viewed the outcome, both authors discussed the revision, 
and they finally agreed upon the final coding.  
In the last step of the data analysis, we calculated Spear-
man’s rank-order correlation coefficients [22] for the ordinal 
scale questions, including the questions about respondents’ 
experience (Q7 and Q8). We aimed to study the relationship 
between the occurrences of the corresponding phenomena 
and determine if e.g. some appear to co-occur. Appendix B 
shows an example of how the coefficients can be calculated. 
3.6 Validity 
We discuss validity according to the four perspectives pre-
sented by Wohlin et al. [69], complemented by survey-
specific validity aspects [19], [20], [34].  
Construct validity is concerned with the relationship be-
tween a theory behind an investigation and its observation. 
Construct validity affects the rest of the validity perspectives. 
As explained above, the current insights into SECIA practice 
are limited, thus there is not a fully developed theory yet. 
Nonetheless, we consider that an initial theory can be de-
rived from prior publications (see Section 2) and we used 
these publications as a basis in the survey to e.g. create the 
questionnaire (see Section 3.2).  
We guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity of the in-
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dividual responses and allowed the respondents to complete 
the survey without identifying themselves in order to miti-
gate potential threats to collection of inaccurate information 
due to evaluation apprehension. Providing pre-defined lists 
in the questionnaire (e.g. of challenges) based on the litera-
ture on software and systems engineering is a limitation of 
this study. This threat was mitigated by allowing the re-
spondents to specify additional information. Selecting a 
subset of SECIA phenomena to ask about (RQs topics) and 
discarding others (e.g., SECIA activities) affect content validi-
ty.  Furthermore, the phrasing of questions can be a threat to 
construct validity, including face validity. We mitigated this 
threat by creating the questionnaire with close reference to 
related work and with the two-stage instrument evaluation. 
The background information collected contributes to criteri-
on validity. 
Internal validity deals with the relationship between a 
treatment and its results. We provided an introduction to the 
survey to make the respondent familiar with the context of 
the study and the kind of information to provide. This con-
tributes to result validity. When ambiguity could exist, we 
included information about the intent of the questions and 
definitions of the terminology used. Instrument evaluation 
allowed us to mitigate ambiguity and misinterpretation 
(instrumentation threat). Designing the survey instrument so 
that it could be completed in approximately 20 minutes 
helped to mitigate maturation. We applied a non-random 
sampling strategy, thus selection bias was not fully avoided. 
Moreover, the performance of the volunteers may be differ-
ent from the entire population’s performance. Although 25% 
of the responses were discarded (attrition threat), we are 
confident that the results provide a valid picture of SECIA in 
practice (see the discussion in Section 4). 
Conclusion validity is concerned with obstacles to draw 
correct conclusions from a study. Obtaining a heterogeneous 
sample of respondents, of which most can be regarded as 
senior practitioners (five or more years or projects of experi-
ence; see Section 4), contributes to conclusion validity. Based 
on the recommendations by Kitchenham et al. [33], we fo-
cused on the analysis of strong (corr. > 0.59) and very strong 
(corr. > 0.74) correlations to identify relationships of practical 
importance between phenomena. The p-values of these 
correlations are below 1e-08. We use the lack of strong or 
very strong correlations and the existence of weak or very 
weak ones (corr. < 0.3) as indications that the relevance in 
practice of some relationships cannot be guaranteed. Alt-
hough further correlations could have been calculated, we 
did not do it to avoid fishing for results.  
Conclusion validity is further strengthened by observer 
triangulation in answer unification and coding. Nonetheless, 
we estimate that a minimal risk remains of having misinter-
preted some free-text answers. Other threats to conclusion 
validity relate to the amount of free-text responses and to 
correlation interpretation. A low number of free-text re-
sponses impacts the extent to which a phenomenon is char-
acterised from the survey. Readers must be careful when 
interpreting correlations because e.g. they do not indicate 
cause-effect. 
External validity is concerned with the generalization of 
the conclusions. We believe that the results constitute a good 
representation of SECIA in practice. It is uncommon that a 
survey on a narrow topic in systems and software engineer-
ing receives almost 100 valid responses. In addition, the 
sample is heterogeneous, more heterogeneous than in relat-
ed surveys (e.g., [48]) regarding the number of countries, 
application domains, and safety standards represented. 
Although the number of respondents from Sweden (17; see 
Section 4) could be considered high, we expect that it has a 
minor impact on external validity. Overall, the rest of the 
background information is similar to [48], and we argue that 
it sufficiently covers industry characteristics. For example, 
respondents’ background is in line the characteristics of 
LinkedIn groups. The domain-specific group in which the 
survey was advertised with the highest number of members 
was on aerospace and the standard-specific group was on 
DO-178.  The group on ISO 13849 had around a fourth of the 
members of the group on ISO 26262, and some emerging 
country-specific groups (e.g., for India) exist. The organiza-
tion and respondents’ roles also cover the whole value 
chain of safety-critical systems engineering, and we con-
sider that USA and Europe are world leaders in safety-
critical systems engineering and assurance (see e.g. [23], 
[32], [37], [47], [50], [55]). 
4 RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
This section reports upon and interprets the survey re-
sults. A subsection has been created for each principal RQ 
(RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3), and these subsections are decom-
posed into specific aspects for answering the RQs. We 
discuss the possible implications for research and practice 
and compare the results with related work. Section 4.4 
presents a summary. 
Tables 1 to 5 present survey results. The cells with bold 
text indicate the mode of the phenomenon under study 
(i.e., for each row), whereas the shaded cells indicate the 
most often reported phenomenon for each possible an-
swer (i.e., for each column). For example, in Table 1 (fre-
quency of situations for SECIA) the mode of Modification 
of a new system during its development is “most projects”, 
and Reuse of existing components in a new system is the situ-
ation most often reported as happening in “some pro-
jects”. The results are presented as frequencies in percent-
ages (ratio of respondents) and data points (in brackets). 
We report all the strong and very strong correlations 
found between ordinal scale questions (Spearman’s rank-
order correlation coefficients; corr. > 0.59 and corr. > 0.74, 
respectively; p < 1e-08). 
Fig. 2 summarises the respondents’ demographics. For 
the application domains, countries, and safety standards, 
we only present the answers provided by three or more 
respondents. The complete lists and descriptions of the 
safety standards are available in [11]. Based on the sample 
characteristics, and as discussed in the next paragraphs 
and in Section 3.6, we consider our sample to be repre-
sentative of the safety-critical system industry. 
Aerospace dominates the 16 application domains rep-
resented in the survey. The respondents mentioned 47 
individual safety standards, with DO-178 as the most 
frequent. Thirty-four respondents reported more than one 
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safety standard. The respondents had worked upon 
SECIA in 28 individual countries while 26 respondents 
specified more than one country. USA was the country 
indicated by the highest number of respondents. Most of 
the companies for which the respondents worked were 
developing final systems, and most of the respondents 
were engineers, had five or more years of experience in 
SECIA, or had been involved in five or more projects. All 
the respondents reported the occurrence of some SECIA 
phenomenon in some project. 
4.1 Circumstances Under Which Safety Evidence 
Change Impact Analysis is Addressed (RQ1)  
RQ1 was answered by 84 out of 97 respondents (questions 
Q9-14 of the questionnaire; Appendix A). 
4.1.1 Situations Frequency 
The results summarized in Table 1 show that SECIA is an 
activity that the respondents had dealt with in several situa-
tions. Modification of a new system during its development is the 
situation with the highest median (“most projects”), most 
 
Fig. 2. Summary of respondents’ demographics 
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frequently indicated as happening in every project, and the 
least frequently indicated as never happening. Fig. 3 shows 
the number of situations reported by the respondents. Most 
of the respondents reported involvement in more than six 
situations. Research institution, development tool vendor, 
and system user are the only organization roles for which no 
respondent reported involvement in all the situations. 
The only strong correlation found for the situations for 
SECIA is between Modification of a new system during its devel-
opment and Modification of a new system as a result of its V&V 
(corr. = 0.6). This relationship appears reasonable because 
system development and V&V are usually regarded as inter-
twined [2], thus they can be intertwined for SECIA too.  
Fewer respondents than expected reported that they had 
never dealt with SECIA for Re-certification of an existing sys-
tem for a different standard and Re-certification of an existing 
system for a different application domain. We consider this an 
indication that SECIA in these situations happens more often 
(‘non-never’ answers) than most people think. Our pre-
understanding is based on discussions among different 
practitioners and researchers. Given the difficulty in cost-
effectively managing re-certification in these situations [13], 
research efforts targeted at the situations are necessary. They 
can have an important impact, and the number of publica-
tions dealing with safety assurance and certification for dif-
ferent standards and domains is very small [47]. The need 
for re-certification (and thus for SECIA) and the associated 
effort and cost are also among the main demotivating factors 
for system modifications [12]. Practitioners have also report-
ed that system re-certification poses challenges for provision 
of safety evidence in general [48]. 
Regarding additional situations in which the respondents 
reported to have been involved in SECIA when asked about 
them (Q10), we consider it particularly interesting to study 
the practices after accidents (reported by one respondent) 
and for system of systems reuse (reported by another re-
spondent). Our hypothesis is that SECIA after an accident 
might be performed more thoroughly than in other situa-
tions, as no one wants to be blamed for a second accident. 
Similarly, SECIA for systems of systems seems to be a situa-
tion in which existing practices might not be effective and 
efficient. The size and complexity of these systems very 
likely give rise to new challenges for SECIA, or make other 
challenges more difficult to address. 
4.1.2 Frequency of Impact Analysis from Artefact 
Types 
Table 2 shows how often the respondents had performed 
SECIA as a consequence of changes in different artefact 
types. Column “N” indicates the number of respondents 
that provided an answer other than “I don’t know”.  
The median of six out of the 14 artefact types (Design 
Specifications, Requirements Specifications, Safety Analysis Re-
sults, Source Code, Test Case Specifications, and Traceability 
Specifications) is in “most projects”, and the mode for all these 
artefact types is in “every project”. Requirements Specifications 
is the artefact type most commonly reported as triggering 
SECIA in every project and with the highest ratio of answers 
other than “never”.  
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  Fig. 3. Number of situations reported by the respondents 
TABLE 1 
FREQUENCY OF SITUATIONS FOR SECIA 
 N Never Few projects 
Some 
projects 
Most 
projects 
Every 
project Median 
Modification of a new system during its 
development 84 
7.1%  
(6) 
13.1%  
(11) 
28.6%  
(24) 
31%  
(26) 
20.2%  
(17) Most projects 
Modification of a new system as a result of its 
V&V 84 
13.1%  
(11) 
21.4%  
(18) 
25%  
(21) 
25%  
(21) 
15.5%  
(13) Some projects 
Re-certification of an existing system after 
some modification 84 
23.8%  
(20) 
15.5%  
(13) 
17.9%  
(15) 
34.5%  
(29) 
8.3%  
(7) Some projects 
Reuse of existing components in a new system 84 13.1%  (11) 
19%  
(16) 
33.3%  
(28) 
28.6%  
(24) 
6%  
(5) Some projects 
Modification of a system during its 
maintenance 84 
23.8%  
(20) 
29.8%  
(25) 
23.8%  
(20) 
17.9  
(15) 
4.7%  
(4) Few projects 
New safety-related request from an assessor or 
a certification authority 84 
26.2%  
(22) 
35.7%  
(30) 
25%  
(21) 
10.7%  
(9) 
2.4%  
(2) Few projects 
Re-certification of an existing system for a 
different operational context 84 
40.5%  
(34) 
23.8%  
(20) 
21.4%  
(18) 
11.9%  
(10) 
2.4%  
(2) Few projects 
Re-certification of an existing system for a 
different standard 84 
50%  
(42) 
20.2%  
(17) 
17.9%  
(15) 
10.7%  
(9) 
1.2%  
(1) 
Few projects/ 
Never 
Re-certification of an existing system for a 
different application domain 84 
59.5%  
(50) 
13.1%  
(11) 
15.5%  
(13) 
10.7%  
(9) 
1.2%  
(1) Never 
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Overall, the results are in line with insights from related 
work. Requirements changes and thus subsequent impact 
analyses are commonly acknowledged as frequent occur-
rences [18]. SECIA from the artefact types was expected 
based on prior work (see Section 2.2), but its relative fre-
quency was unknown for most artefact types. It was hard to 
judge for instance the extent to which SECIA is performed 
from Safety Cases. The results also uncover an important gap 
in prior research: Safety Analysis Results seem to trigger 
SECIA in most projects, but their evolutionary nature and 
impact analysis from them have received little attention.  
When asked about further artefact types from which 
SECIA was performed, the individual free-text responses 
referred to: 
a) Critical component maintenance information for 
security assurance 
b) Project methodology and regulation authority doc-
umentation 
c) Compliance plans 
d) Means for verification 
We argue that this additional information shows two 
characteristics of the current state of practice. First, there is a 
growing interest in the relation between safety and security. 
Second, changes in safety standards and how to perform 
SECIA according to these changes is an important concern, 
including changes in the way to comply with the standards. 
4.1.3 Frequency of Change Impact on Artefact Types 
Table 3 shows how often the artefact types had been affected 
by changes to the body of safety evidence. Column “N” 
indicates the number of respondents that provided an an-
swer other than “I don’t know”. Manual V&V results ob-
tained the highest median, whereas Requirements Specifica-
tions were reported as being affected in every project by the 
TABLE 2 
SECIA FREQUENCY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF CHANGES IN ARTEFACT TYPES 
 N Never Few projects Some projects Most projects Every project Median 
Requirements Specifications 78 3.8% (3) 9% (7) 25.6% (20) 23.1% (18) 38.5% (30) Most projects 
Source Code 74 13.5% (10) 16.2% (12) 16.2% (12) 20.3% (15) 33.8% (25) Most projects 
Test Case Specifications 77 9.1% (7) 16.9% (13) 22.1% (17) 20.8% (16) 31.1% (24) Most projects 
Traceability Specifications 78 10.3% (8) 21.8% (17) 12.8% (10) 24.3% (19) 30.8% (24) Most projects 
Design Specifications 76 7.9% (6) 13.1% (10) 25% (19) 23.7% (18) 30.3% (23) Most projects 
Safety Analysis Results 76 3.9% (3) 22.4% (17) 19.7% (15) 26.3% (20) 27.7% (21) Most projects 
Manual V&V Results 76 9.2% (7) 23.7% (18) 26.3% (20) 14.5% (11) 26.3% (20) Some projects 
Safety Cases 77 10.4% (8) 22.1% (17) 27.2% (21) 14.3% (11) 26% (20) Some projects 
Assumptions and Operation 
Conditions Specifications 73 11% (8) 20.5% (15) 32.9% (24) 16.4% (12) 19.2% (14) Some projects 
Tool-Supported V&V Results 76 18.4% (14) 22.4% (17) 25%(19) 13.2% (10) 21% (16) Some projects 
Architecture Specifications 71 22.6% (16) 21.1% (15) 18.3% (13) 19.7% (14) 18.3% (13) Some projects 
System Lifecycle Plans 76 23.7% (18) 25% (19) 18.4% (14) 15.8% (12) 17.1% (13) Some projects 
Reused Components 
Information 72 20.8% (15) 29.2% (21) 16.7% (12) 18% (13) 15.3% (11) 
Some/Few 
projects 
Personnel Competence 
Specifications 70 40% (28) 24.3% (17) 14.3% (10) 8.6% (6) 12.8% (9) Few projects 
 
TABLE 3 
CHANGE IMPACT FREQUENCY IN ARTEFACT TYPES 
 N Never Few projects Some projects Most projects Every project Median 
Manual V&V Results 74 4.1% (3) 18.9% (14) 25.7% (19) 24.3% (18) 27% (20) Most projects 
Test Case Specifications 77 3.9% (3) 15.6% (12) 31.1% (24) 27.3% (21) 22.1% (17) Some projects 
Source Code 74 2.7% (2) 14.9% (11) 33.8% (25) 21.6% (16) 27% (20) Some projects 
Safety Cases 73 6.9% (5) 21.9% (16) 23.3% (17) 21.9% (16) 26% (19) Some projects 
Requirements Specifications 76 5.3% (4) 18.4% (14) 31.6% (24) 15.8% (12) 28.9% (22) Some projects 
Safety Analysis Results 73 4.1% (3) 23.3% (17) 30.1% (22) 17.8% (13) 24.7% (18) Some projects 
Design Specifications 76 1.3% (1) 25% (19) 32.9% (25) 17.1% (13) 23.7% (18) Some projects 
Traceability Specifications 74 10.8% (8) 24.3% (18) 25.7% (19) 14.9% (11) 24.3% (18) Some projects 
Architecture Specifications 75 10.7% (8) 25.3% (19) 37.3% (28) 10.7% (8) 16% (12) Some projects 
Assumptions and Operation 
Conditions Specifications 71 14.1% (10) 29.6% (21) 26.7% (19) 12.7% (9) 16.9% (12) Some projects 
Tool-Supported V&V Res. 73 13.7% (10) 37% (27) 17.8% (13) 13.7% (10) 17.8% (13) Few projects 
System Lifecycle Plans 75 22.7% (17) 29.3% (22) 22.7% (17) 10.7% (8) 14.6% (11) Few projects 
Reused Components Info. 70 21.4% (15) 31.4% (22) 25.7% (18) 11.5% (8) 10% (7) Few projects 
Personnel Competence Spec. 68 39.7% (27) 30.9% (21) 16.2% (11) 7.3% (5) 5.9% (4) Few projects 
 
DE LA VARA, BORG, WNUK, MOONEN:  AN INDUSTRIAL SURVEY OF SAFETY EVIDENCE CHANGE IMPACT ANALYSIS PRACTICE 11 
 
highest ratio of respondents. 
These results, in combination with those in Table 2, indi-
cate that Requirements Specifications probably have the most 
important role in SECIA, whereas Personnel Competence Speci-
fications probably have the least important one. A possible 
explanation for the latter can be that personnel competence 
rarely changes during a system’s lifecycle because of the 
stringent requirements from safety standards on the in-
volved people’s experience and education. Another reason 
could be that Personnel Competence Specifications barely de-
pend on other artefact types, and vice-versa. Nonetheless, 
we show below that some strong correlations with Personnel 
Competence Specifications have been found. 
It can be interesting to compare the differences between 
the use of the artefact types as safety evidence (according to 
Nair et al. [48]) and their role as SECIA triggers and as affect-
ed by changes. For example, Requirements Specifications was 
reported to be used as evidence by 87% of the participants in 
[48]. Among the respondents that provided information 
about RQ1, 89% reported SECIA from the artefact type and 
85% reported change impact. All these figures are very close, 
which can be interpreted as an indicator of the changing 
nature of requirements. The same applies to Design Specifica-
tions, Test Case Specifications, and Traceability Specifications. 
When asked about further artefact types affected by 
changes, the respondents referred again to security infor-
mation and to compliance plans (one respondent each).  
No strong or very strong correlations have been identified 
between the situations in Table 1 and the artefact types in 
Tables 2 and 3. Therefore, we cannot claim that the frequency 
of SECIA from certain artefact types, or of change impact on 
them, greatly depends on the situation in which a SECIA is 
performed. 
4.1.4 Correlations Between Artefact Types 
Fig. 4 shows all the strong and very strong correlations iden-
tified between the artefact types as SECIA triggers (results in 
Table 2) and as types affected by changes (results in Table 3). 
The values of these correlations are provided in Appendix C. 
Their p-values are below 1e-08. 
For example, Requirements Specifications and Traceability 
Specifications are strongly correlated both as SECIA triggers 
 
 
  Fig. 4. Strong correlations (shaded triangle) and very strong correlations (black triangles) between artefact types, for the roles indicated by 
  the triangles according to their position 
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(  in Fig. 4) and as affected by changes (  in Fig. 4), and 
Architecture Specifications as SECIA trigger are strongly corre-
lated to Test Case Specifications as affected by changes (  in 
Fig. 4). Our interpretation is as follows: if Requirements Speci-
fications trigger SECIA, so likely do Traceability Specifications; 
also, if Requirements Specifications are affected by changes, so 
likely are Traceability Specifications; finally, if Architecture Speci-
fications trigger SECIA, Test Case Specifications are likely af-
fected by changes.  
Strong and very strong correlations have also been identi-
fied between the results in Tables 2 and 3 for a given artefact 
type (  in the diagonal of Fig. 4). We refer to these correla-
tions as correlations of an artefact type with itself, and inter-
pret them as either (1) correlations between individual com-
ponents of a given artefact type (e.g., requirements in Re-
quirements Specifications, classes in Source Code, or elements of 
System Lifecycle Plans), or (2) correlations between instances 
of a given artefact type (e.g., individual functional specifica-
tions for Requirements Specifications, different Source Code files, 
or various verification reports for Manual V&V Results). For 
the correlations of an artefact type with itself, only one corre-
lation is shown in Fig. 4 (i.e.,  instead of ) because the 
correlation from Table 2 to Table 3 is the same as from Table 3 
to Table 2.  
Fig. 5 synthesises all the correlations between artefact 
types by means of a graph. The figure shows which pairs 
of artefact types have some strong correlation (only 
strong correlations) and which have both strong and very 
strong correlation. Artefact types with a strong or very 
strong correlation with themselves are also indicated. 
We interpret these correlations as the evidence of the joint 
involvement of the artefact types in SECIA. More important-
ly, these correlations indicate relationships whose documen-
tation and maintenance is arguably of utmost importance. 
The relationships show the artefact types that will likely be 
involved in SECIA when other types are. This kind of infor-
mation is not provided in detail in safety standards but can 
help practitioners know the artefact types to consider in a 
SECIA. Standards typically only state that system suppliers 
need to analyse impact as a result of system or software 
changes and maintenance, and to determine re-assessment 
needs after a change. 
We identified 17 strong correlations and four very strong 
correlations between the artefact types as SECIA triggers. A 
possible explanation for this is that SECIA is performed for 
pairs of artefact types (e.g., Requirements Specifications and 
Design Specifications) in a same SECIA effort or in related 
activities.  
There is a very strong correlation between Requirements 
Specifications and Source Code as SECIA triggers (corr. = 0.82). 
A possible explanation for this correlation might be that 
requirements change after source code has already been 
implemented. Such a change could happen for example at 
late system development stages or when a new version of a 
system is developed. The very strong correlation between 
Assumptions and Operation Conditions Specifications and Safety 
Analysis Results (corr. = 0.75) confirms the importance of the 
former artefact type for creating the latter. The same applies 
to the very strong correlation between Requirements Specifica-
tions and Design Specifications (corr. = 0.78). The very strong 
correlation between Source Code and Test Case Specifications 
(corr. = 0.75) also seems logical to us. It is noteworthy that no 
strong correlation as SECIA triggers has been found between 
some pairs of artefact types commonly studied together in 
the literature, e.g. Requirements Specifications and Architecture 
Specifications.  
We found 27 strong correlations between the artefact 
types that were reported as affected by changes. Again, Re-
quirements Specifications and Design Specifications are very 
strongly correlated (corr. = 0.78), and it is the only very 
strong correlation between artefact types as affected by 
changes. 
We detected 25 strong correlations and one very strong 
correlation regarding artefact types as SECIA triggers and as 
affected by changes. These correlations indicate the existence 
of many important relationships between the artefact types 
for impact analysis sequences. We interpret the very strong 
correlation of Source Code with itself (corr. = 0.76) as a clear 
indicator of ripple effects on safety-critical source code.  
Nine pairs of artefact types in Fig. 4 have three or four 
correlations:  
1) Requirements Specifications and Source Code 
2) Requirements Specifications and Design Specifications 
3) Requirements Specifications and Test Case Specifications 
4) Test Case Specifications and Source Code 
5) Design Specifications and Source Code 
6) Traceability Specifications and Source Code 
7) Test Case Specifications and Manual V&V Results  
Assumptions & 
Operation 
Conditions Specs.
Safety Cases
Source Code
Manual V&V 
Results
Tool-Supported 
V&V Results
Test Case 
Specifications
Traceability 
Specifications
Design 
Specifications
Architecture 
Specifications
Requirements 
Specifications
Safety Analysis 
Results
Personnel 
Competence 
Specifications
Reused 
Component 
Information
System Lifecycle 
Plans
Artefact type Artefact type with a strong correlation with itself
Artefact type with a very strong correlation with itself
Strong correlation between the pair of artefact types
Strong and very strong correlation between the pair of artefact types Legend  
  Fig. 5. Artefact types correlations graph 
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8) Design Specifications and Test Case Specifications 
9) Safety Analysis Results and Assumptions and Operation 
Conditions Specifications 
These pairs can be regarded as the most relevant for 
SECIA in practice. It is important to note that prior 
research has studied most of them. Nonetheless, 
publications on SECIA and traceability related to Manual 
V&V Results are scarce [47], and some pairs (5-9) have 
been considerably less studied than others (1-4).  
Approaches for analysing previous impact analysis re-
ports such as the one presented by Borg et al. [5] can facili-
tate further analyses of all these relationships and provide 
new insights. This approach supports the analysis of how 
changes in a given artefact type affect other artefact types, 
and of the extent to which the changes propagate. 
One result subject to interpretation is change impact on 
Safety Cases. A safety case corresponds to a collection of 
references to other artefacts to justify system safety and 
compliance. Therefore, changes in the referred artefacts 
affect safety and compliance justification. Looking at the 
medians, change impact on Safety Cases (“some projects”, 
Table 3) seems to be less often than SECIA triggered from 
other six artefact types (“most projects”; Table 2). In 
addition, Safety Cases have no strong or very strong 
correlation as affected by changes when other artefact 
types trigger SECIA (Fig. 4). These results suggest that 
potential change impacts on Safety Cases, as a result of 
SECIA from referred artefacts, do not lead to actual 
changes to this artefact type.  
We find three possible explanations. First, changes in 
other artefact types might be made before a safety case 
refers to them. Second, although some artefacts are 
referred to in a safety case, their changes might not 
impact the safety case. Third, industry might not be 
adequately addressing how changes in the body of safety 
evidence impact a safety case. Indeed, the insights that we 
provide can raise some concerns on how safety case 
evolution is managed. 
It is recognised as a good practice to incrementally and 
iteratively create safety cases [32], as instances of other 
artefact types are created and maintained. In fact, this 
approach is recommended in some safety standards, 
explicitly (e.g., Defence Standard 00-56) or implicitly (e.g., 
EN 50129). Consequently, it would be logical that the 
median for Safety Cases in Table 3 was higher than “some 
projects”, and that Safety Cases had strong or very strong 
correlations with more artefact types (e.g., Architecture 
Specifications, in line with [3]). Albeit “every project” was 
the mode for Safety Cases in Table 3, 28.8% of the 
respondents indicated that Safety Cases had never been 
affected by changes or had been affected in few projects.  
Given the importance of safety cases, we argue that 
how they are affected by changes in other artefact types 
and how their evolution is managed are two areas that 
require further research. Safety case creation during late 
system development phases can lead to deficiencies such 
as confirmation bias and thus decrease their credibility. 
Many experts have discussed the adequacy of and the 
need for safety case regimes for safety-critical systems 
based on their own insights or single case studies (e.g., 
[37]). Our study appears to be the first that empirically 
shows that many practitioners might not be adequately 
managing safety case evolution. 
As an overall conclusion, we argue that further 
research efforts on impact analysis for safety-critical 
systems are necessary. More specifically, we believe that 
further investigations on impact analysis regarding 
safety-targeted artefact types are essential, especially for 
those with over half a dozen strong or very strong 
correlations (Safety Analysis Results, Assumptions and 
Operation Conditions Specifications, Manual V&V Results, 
and Safety Cases). Their adequate change management is 
essential for ensuring safety, especially for software-
intensive systems. It has been acknowledged that many 
practitioners fail to understand and identify software 
safety risks (e.g., [37]), including software change impact 
on system safety. 
Finally, a question remains why only one strong 
correlation has been found between Tool-Supported V&V 
Results and the rest of artefact types. Someone could 
expect a higher number of strong or very strong 
correlations, higher than for Manual V&V Results, and a 
higher correlation with Test Cases Specifications or Source 
Code. Changes in these artefacts might impact, for 
instance, existing testing results. The results suggest that 
Test Cases Specifications and Source Code most commonly 
change before Tool-Supported V&V Results are available. 
4.2 Tool Support for Safety Evidence Change 
Impact Analysis (RQ2) 
Eighty-four out of 97 respondents provided information 
for answering RQ2 (questions Q15-19 of the question-
naire; Appendix A).  
4.2.1 Level of Automation in Safety Evidence Change 
Impact Analysis 
Table 4 shows the level of automation for the tool support 
used for SECIA when the artefact types change. Column 
”N” indicates the number of respondents that provided an 
answer other than “I don’t know”. The levels of SECIA au-
tomation were defined based on a previous study on human 
interaction with automation [52]: 
• Fully manual: no automation in the process; e.g., 
impact determined by reading documentation and 
asking colleagues. 
• Decision support available: limited support for nar-
rowing down a selection of possible impact; e.g., 
search tool used to seek impact, repositories easy to 
browse thanks to information structure. 
• Semi-automated recommendations: tools suggest arte-
facts that might be impacted but humans must con-
firm. 
• Highly automated recommendations: tools report im-
pact and humans have the authority to veto the 
suggestions. 
• Automatic impact analysis: tools determine the im-
pact without human involvement. 
Except for the Source Code artefact type, the median for all 
artefact types is “decision support available” or “fully man-
ual”. In addition, the mode is different from “fully manual” 
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only for three artefact types. These responses imply that 
SECIA is most often performed manually. Such manual 
work is not only time consuming and error prone, but might 
also lead to mistakes when detecting safety and compliance 
risks. Overall, the high number of “fully manual” responses 
is surprising because many basic tools with some search 
functionality such as Excel and Word (reported as used for 
SECIA; see Section 4.2.2) are probably available at the re-
spondent’s organizations. It remains for further investigation 
whether the awareness of these tools was low or the func-
tionality that they provide is insufficient for SECIA.  
SECIA from Requirements Specifications was reported as 
“fully manual” by 40% of the respondents, despite the exist-
ence of many requirements management tools that provide 
some automated support [9], and the relatively higher level 
of automation reported for Traceability Specifications. It is 
unexpected to us that 31.5% of the respondents indicated 
that SECIA from Source Code was “fully manual”, since 
Source Code is typically created in development environ-
ments (i.e., software tools) that offer various automation 
features.  
The level of automation for Assumptions and Operation 
Conditions Specifications could raise some concerns. It is not 
only the artefact type for which SECIA has been most fre-
quently reported as “fully manual”, but also a type whose 
inadequate change management led to e.g. the well-known 
accident of Ariane 5 in 1996 [37] and other more recent acci-
dents or near-accidents in the space domain and in transpor-
tation systems [23]. Moreover, most of the respondents had 
dealt with SECIA from Assumptions and Operation Conditions 
Specifications (Table 2) and with Re-certification of an existing 
system for a different operational context (Table 1). To some 
extent, this result suggests that prevention measures to avoid 
prior accidents could be improved. Furthermore, Assump-
tions and Operation Conditions Specifications are essential for 
any safety-critical system, as they can only be deemed safe 
for a given operational context [32]. 
Regarding the relationships between the levels of auto-
mation for various artefact types, we found strong correla-
tions (p < 1e-08) between the levels for Design Specifications 
and Traceability Specifications (corr. = 0.62), Traceability Specifi-
cations and Tool-Supported V&V Results (corr. = 0.61), and 
Source Code and Safety Cases (corr. = 0.67). These relationships 
make us suspect that there is tool support that can automate 
SECIA from both artefact types of these pairs, e.g. DOORS or 
some internal tool according to the results in Section 4.2.2. 
This hypothesis should be further investigated.  
We have not found any strong or very strong correlations 
between the level of automation and the SECIA situations 
and artefact types (RQ1). This lack of correlations suggests 
that the level of automation does not vary much among the 
industrial contexts studied for RQ1. 
Individual free-text responses emphasised that:  
a) The level of automation is increasing 
b) SECIA qualified tools are important and necessary 
c) Although tools are used, change impact is always as-
sessed manually 
d) More advanced tools, whose results can be used as 
evidence, are necessary for evidence review 
This additional information indicates that some practi-
tioners regard the level of automation as increasing, but they 
still expect improvements – especially on tool qualification. 
The use of qualified tools would imply that manual assess-
ment would not be necessary in (c), and that certification 
authorities would accept (d). 
The results outlined in Table 4 confirm several observa-
tions from previous work. Research often focuses on impact 
analysis for Source Code [36], which has led to a considerable 
number of automated source code impact analysis proposals 
and thus more possible automated solutions for practice. 
Traceability information plays a major role for impact analy-
sis and is typically maintained with some supporting tool 
TABLE 4 
LEVEL OF AUTOMATION OFFERED BY TOOLS FOR SECIA FROM EACH ARTEFACT TYPE 
 
N Fully Manual 
Decision 
Support 
Available 
Semi-
Automated 
Recomm. 
Highly-
Automated 
Recomm. 
Automatic 
Impact 
Analysis 
Median 
Source Code 73 31.5% (23) 16.4% (12) 31.5% (23) 17.8% (13) 2.8% (2) Semi-Automated Recommendations 
Traceability Specifications 79 25.3% (20) 26.6% (21) 27.8% (22) 15.2% (12) 5.1% (4) Decision Support Available 
Architecture Specifications 72 34.7% (25) 41.7% (30) 19.4% (14) 1.4% (1) 2.8% (2) Decision Support Available 
Tool-Supported V&V Results 79 32.9% (26) 21.5% (17) 24.1% (19) 17.7% (14) 3.8% (3) Decision Support Available 
Test Case Specifications 79 39.2% (31) 29.1% (23) 20.3% (16) 8.9% (7) 2.5% (2) Decision Support Available 
Requirements Specifications 80 40% (32) 33.8% (27) 16.2% (13) 8.7% (7) 1.3% (1) Decision Support Available 
Safety Analysis Results 76 40.8% (31) 23.7% (18) 23.7% (18) 10.5% (8) 1.3% (1) Decision Support Available 
Design Specifications 76 42.1% (32) 35.5% (27) 17.1% (13) 4% (3) 1.3% (1) Decision Support Available 
Safety Cases 73 56.1% (41) 27.4% (20) 13.7% (10) 1.4% (1) 1.4% (1) Fully Manual 
Manual V&V Results 78 56.4% (44) 23.1% (18) 16.7% (13) 3.8% (3) 0% (0) Fully Manual 
Reused Components Info. 71 59.2% (42) 31% (22) 7% (5) 1.4% (1) 1.4% (1) Fully Manual 
Personnel Competence Specs. 66 63.6% (42) 28.8% (19) 7.6% (5) 0% (0) 0% (0) Fully Manual 
System Lifecycle Plans 75 65.4% (49) 21.3% (16) 9.3% (7) 4% (3) 0% (0) Fully Manual 
Assumptions and Operation 
Conditions Specifications 72 68.1% (49) 20.8% (15) 9.7% (7) 1.4% (1) 0% (0) Fully Manual 
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[9][55]. Therefore, we expected that most respondents re-
ported some SECIA automation for Traceability Specifications. 
Previous work suggests that the overall level of SECIA au-
tomation is low (e.g., [21], [57], [64]), and also that automatic 
change impact seems to be used for some artefact types [48].  
Our study refines these general insights by providing ev-
idence of the level of automation for each artefact type, gath-
ered from a much larger sample of practitioners. The level of 
automation seems to vary among the artefact types, and the 
existence of many commercial tools for managing certain 
artefact types (e.g., Requirements Specifications) does not result 
in a much higher level of SECIA automation. Finally, there 
seems to be a research gap in impact analysis automation for 
Assumptions and Operation Conditions Specifications, Manual 
V&V Results, Personnel Competence Specifications, Reused Com-
ponents Information, Safety Cases, and System Lifecycle Plans.  
4.2.2 Tools for Safety Evidence Change Impact 
Analysis 
The respondents listed 98 different tools for SECIA purposes. 
Traceability Specifications and Requirements Specifications are 
the artefact types for which the highest ratio of respondents 
indicated some tool support (Fig. 6), whereas the highest 
variation of tools was found for Source Code (Fig. 7). Internal 
tools were reported as used for SECIA from all the artefact 
types and tailored extensions of commercial tools for most 
artefact types, see Fig. 8. Only two commercial tools (Vero-
Trace and DOORS) were mentioned for more than half of the 
artefact types. However, only one respondent reported the 
use of VeroTrace. Some model-based tools (e.g., Artisan Stu-
dio, ASCE, and Rhapsody) were reported for 10 out of the 14 
artefact types (71.4%).  
A summary of the tools for storing SECIA evidence and 
for SECIA from each artefact type is shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 
10, respectively. These figures list the tools reported by at 
least two respondents. Appendix D provides a description of 
these tools. Information about the rest of tools reported by 
the respondents can be found in [11]. When reporting the 
use of compilers for SECIA, we understand that the re-
spondents referred to software development environments. 
Tools that are not specifically targeted at SECIA or sys-
tems engineering such as Excel and Word seem to be com-
monly used. Internal tools are the most frequently used for 
nine out of the 14 artefact types, and DOORS had the highest 
number of respondents reporting its use for a given artefact 
type (Requirements Specifications and Traceability Specifica-
tions). Thirty-seven different tools were mentioned for stor-
ing SECIA evidence, with internal tools mentioned most 
frequently. 
Reviewing the results in the context of related work, our 
survey identified an extensive number of tools involved in 
SECIA. Prior publications [36], [47] have paid little attention 
to the use of basic tools (e.g., Excel and Word) for impact 
analysis purposes, and some tools usually mentioned in the 
literature (e.g., JRipples) do not seem to have been adopted 
for safety-critical systems. Our survey provides evidence of 
how often tools are applied in industry for SECIA. The evi-
dence includes practitioners’ use of internal tools, the exten-
sion of commercial tools, the adoption of general-purpose 
tools, and the use of models. Based on our results and past 
surveys [48], [50], [59], DOORS appears to be one of the 
main tools for safety-critical system engineering and assur-
ance. 
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Fig. 10. Summary of the tools for SECIA per artefact type and respondents that reported them 
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The results help bridge the gap between the insights, as-
sumptions, and claims presented in the literature and the 
state of the practice. In this sense, we argue that researchers 
should be careful when making statements regarding the 
suitability of impact analysis tools, or the need for them. 
Although more tool support is probably necessary, we won-
der if, for instance, research on new source code impact 
analysis tools should be prioritized, given the high number 
of commercially available tools. The remaining question is 
what kind of new SECIA tool support is necessary, especially 
taking into account the challenges perceived by the respond-
ents (Section 4.3), and thus what specific tool aspects should 
be investigated. Tools that integrate and use safety evidence 
meta-information from different sources for SECIA seem to 
be highly desirable [48]. 
4.3 Challenges in Safety Evidence Change Impact 
Analysis (RQ3) 
Ninety out of the 97 respondents provided information for 
answering RQ3 (questions Q20-22 of the questionnaire; 
Appendix A).  
4.3.1 Challenges Frequency 
Table 5 provides the frequencies of the experienced SECIA 
challenges. No challenge has “never” or “every project” as 
the mode. While almost 100 tools for SECIA were reported 
(Section 4.2.2), the challenge with the highest median is In-
sufficient tool support.  
When analysing the relationship between pairs of chal-
lenges and between the challenges and other phenomena, 
we only identified a strong correlation between the chal-
lenges Difficulty in assessing system-level impact of component 
reuse and Difficulty in deciding if a component can be reused 
(corr. = 0.61; p < 1e-08). This correlation could be expected 
because both challenges refer to component reuse. The lack 
of relevant correlations with SECIA circumstances (RQ1) 
suggests that the challenges do not occur more often in cer-
tain situations or when dealing with certain artefact types. 
We find it interesting that the correlation between the re-
spondents’ experience (see Fig. 2) and the frequency of the 
challenges is very weak, weak, or very close to weak (-0.32 
<= corr. <= -0.1; average corr. = -0.19). This suggests that the 
challenges are visible as soon as someone gets involved in 
SECIA and that experience rarely mitigates them. This find-
ing is of particular importance for experiments on SECIA in 
which students are subjects, especially on SECIA challenges. 
It should not be claimed that the results of the experiments 
would necessarily differ with experienced practitioners. 
We cannot claim that a higher level of SECIA automation 
will decrease the frequency of the challenges because we 
have not found any strong or very strong correlation in that 
matter. This may seem counterintuitive for the Insufficient 
TABLE 5 
SECIA CHALLENGES FREQUENCY 
 N Never Few projects 
Some 
projects 
Most 
projects 
Every 
project Median 
Insufficient tool support 90 11.1% (10) 
21.1% 
(19) 
17.8% 
(16) 
34.4% 
(31) 
15.6% 
(14) 
Most/ Some 
projects 
Difficulty in estimating the effort required to manage a 
change 90 
4.4% 
(4) 
17.8% 
(16) 
31.1% 
(28) 
36.7% 
(33) 10% (9) Some projects 
Vast number of artefacts to trace 90 7.8% (7) 
15.6% 
(14) 
35.6% 
(32) 
25.6% 
(23) 
15.6% 
(14) Some projects 
Too coarse granularity of the traceability between 
artefacts to accurately know the consequences of a 
change 
90 10% (9) 
25.5% 
(23) 
26.7% 
(24) 
28.9% 
(26) 8.9% (8) Some projects 
Insufficient traceability between artefacts to accurately 
know the consequences of a change 90 
5.6% 
(5) 
25.6% 
(23) 
32.2% 
(29) 
28.9% 
(26) 7.8% (7) Some projects 
Difficulty in determining the effect of a change on 
system safety 90 
4.4% 
(4) 
23.3% 
(21) 
38.9% 
(35) 
24.4% 
(22) 8.9% (8) Some projects 
Long time for evaluating the consequences of a change 90 5.6% (5) 
27.8% 
(25) 
34.4% 
(31) 
25.6% 
(23) 6.7% (6) Some projects 
Difficulty in assessing system-level impact of 
component reuse 90 
10% 
(9) 
28.9% 
(26) 
38.9% 
(35) 
18.9% 
(17) 3.3% (3) Some projects 
Unclear meaning of the traceability between artefacts in 
order to know how to manage a change 90 
15.6% 
(14) 
26.7% 
(24) 
35.6% 
(32) 
17.8% 
(16) 4.4% (4) Some projects 
Insufficient confidence by assessor or certifiers in 
having managed a change properly 90 
20% 
(18) 
27.8% 
(25) 
32.2% 
(29) 
16.7% 
(15) 3.3% (3) Some projects 
Lack of a systematic process for performing impact 
analysis 90 
12.2% 
(11) 
28.9% 
(26) 
27.8% 
(25) 20% (18) 
11.1% 
(10) Some projects 
Difficulty in deciding if a component can be reused 90 21.1% (19) 30% (27) 
31.1% 
(28) 
14.4% 
(13) 3.3% (3) Few projects 
Excessive detail of the traceability between artefacts, 
making traceability management more complex than 
necessary for impact analysis purposes 
90 25.6% (23) 
32.2% 
(29) 
26.7% 
(24) 
11.1% 
(10) 4.4% (4) Few projects 
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tool support challenge, which has weak or very weak correla-
tions with the level of SECIA automation for each artefact 
type (-0.27 <= corr. <= 0.02; average corr. = -0.15). We consid-
er that better tool support is beyond simple automation such 
as the identification of potential impacts. Tools can further 
guide users when performing SECIA, indicating e.g. how to 
manage the impact. 
We received the following information in the individual 
free-text answers about further challenges:  
a) Difficulty in understanding and following safety 
standards’ indications 
b) Difficulty in assessing safety impact using the availa-
ble trace data 
c) Lack of detail in existing data justification (e.g., trace 
link but no explanation), making it difficult to know 
if change compromises the justification 
d) Insufficient attention to traceability 
e) Finding the right balance between fine and coarse 
traceability 
f) Traceability between all the different environments 
and tools used in system lifecycle 
g) Difficulty in tracing the origin and real date of a 
change cause 
h) Inefficient SECIA and variability in how to address it 
depending on the artefacts involved 
i) Lack of an efficient regression verification strategy 
j) Feature creep (scope creep), lack of support or doc-
umentation for programming language, undocu-
mented source code, and ageing legacy systems 
k) Lack of automated support for effort estimation 
l) Involvement of many different people and organisa-
tions (sub-suppliers, customers, system engineers, 
safety engineers, lawyers...), with different interests  
m) Change assessors’ lack of knowledge to adequately 
assess an impact or subsequent impact(s) 
n) Management’s lack of knowledge about risks 
o) Pressure to meet project time scale, and insufficient 
staff with the right level of competence  
Although most of these challenges are acknowledged in 
the literature (e.g., [2], [13], [42], [46]), the respondents pro-
vided new details, e.g. in (c), (h), (l), and (m). Many answers 
also specialise some of the fixed challenges provided in Q20. 
For example, “Difficulty in assessing safety impact using the 
available trace data” can be regarded as a specialisation of 
Difficulty in determining the effect of a change on system safety. In 
our opinion, the combined set of challenges (those in the 
questionnaire and those mentioned by the respondents) 
shows that SECIA is very demanding and it should be care-
fully planned, performed, and verified. Indeed, Q21 was the 
free-text question for indicating additional information with 
the highest number of answers, considerably higher than for 
the others. The social challenges of SECIA (e.g., (l)) might be 
more difficult to address because they could require a 
change of attitude towards how to perform SECIA, not only 
the use of e.g. some new tool or guidance. 
When comparing the results from Q20 and Q21 with the 
challenges reported by Nair et al. [48], we find that issues 
related to confidence in evidence, application of safety 
standards, evidence structuring and traceability, and com-
ponent reuse are common to provision of safety evidence 
(i.e., the phenomenon under study in [48]) and SECIA (the 
focus of this study). Therefore, it seems that these aspects can 
affect the whole assurance process of a safety-critical system. 
4.3.2 How to Improve Safety Evidence Change Impact 
Analysis 
Seventy-six respondents provided information about how 
SECIA could be improved. We identified three main im-
provement areas: Information aspects, Process aspects, and Tool 
aspects. These areas were identified through the coding pro-
cedure described in Section 3.5, and are decomposed into the 
following sub-areas (answer codes). 
Information aspects referred to the need for more infor-
mation related to or for SECIA execution: 
• Communication: information exchange among those 
involved in SECIA activities 
• Data used for analysis: pieces of data that are consult-
ed when deciding upon how to perform SECIA ac-
tivities 
• Guidance: information available for guiding SECIA 
• Knowledge: existing information about how to deal 
with SECIA 
• Safety cases: documented system safety justification 
• SECIA process transparency: degree of knowledge 
about SECIA activities for those not directly in-
volved in the activities 
• Standards: industrially-accepted best practices fol-
lowed for ensuring system safety 
• System specifications: artefacts describing system 
structure, behaviour, or constraints 
• Traceability: relationship between two artefacts 
• Training: knowledge acquisition for those involved 
in SECIA 
Process aspects referred to the need for better SECIA execu-
tion processes: 
• Analysis of impact on safety: the effect that the chang-
es in the body of safety evidence can have on sys-
tem safety 
• Analysis process: the process followed for SECIA 
• Coordination: the degree to which those involved in 
SECIA activities work cooperatively 
• Credibility: the degree to which someone would 
agree that SECIA activities have been adequately 
performed 
• Independence: the degree of difference between those 
involved in SECIA activities 
• SECIA verification: the activities targeted at guaran-
teeing that impact analysis and change manage-
ment have been adequately addressed 
• System development: the activities targeted at specify-
ing and creating a system 
• System V&V: the activities targeted at providing an 
assurance of certain system properties 
• Time aspects: time resources necessary for and time 
constraints on SECIA 
Tool aspects referred to the need for new or better SECIA 
tools: 
• Level of automation: the degree of automatic support 
offered by tool support 
• Tool integration: the degree of information exchange 
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between the tools used in a system’s lifecycle, in-
cluding SECIA-related tools 
• Tool support: available tools for performing SECIA 
Based on the results from answer coding, we have created 
the taxonomy of SECIA improvement areas shown in Fig. 11 
using a bottom-up process. We defined the three main im-
provement areas from the generalization and grouping of 
the codes (sub-areas) assigned to the answers during data 
analysis. Each answer had one or more codes. We also iden-
tified specialisation relationships between some pairs of 
codes (e.g., Tool support and Level of automation). Further rela-
tionships among the improvement areas can be established, 
e.g., information can be necessary for and tools can be used 
as means for process execution. As explained in Section 3.5, 
the coding was initiated by the first author and later iterated 
with the second author until the final codes were defined.  
Finally, the third and the fourth authors reviewed the taxon-
omy. 
Fig. 12 shows the percentage and the number (in brack-
ets) of respondents that indicated each improvement area, 
from the 76 that answered this question. Over two thirds of 
the respondents mentioned Information aspects. The most 
frequent specific area was Tool support, followed by Traceabil-
ity. Specific topics mentioned by individual respondents that 
we consider especially relevant are: 
a) Impact analysis activities need to be more systematic 
b) Better understandings of change effect semantics 
c) Better safety engineering principles and methods 
d) Wider knowledge about safety goals in development 
teams 
e) Impact simulation, including simulation of system 
behaviour after a change 
f) Higher quality of safety evidence, in particular better 
documentation of the scope, assumptions, and esti-
mated impact of potential future changes 
g) Use of modular safety cases 
h) Standards’ requirements clarification 
i) Existing tools are either (1) too expensive and com-
plex or (2) not very suitable and useful 
We also analysed which improvement areas could con-
tribute to mitigating each challenge listed in Table 5. The 
outcome is shown in Table 6. Analysis process and Guidance 
are the areas related to the highest number of challenges (10 
out of 13). Therefore, it could be argued that they are the 
improvement areas that can have a wider impact on the 
mitigation of SECIA challenges. 
Although references to the improvement areas can be 
found in safety standards and related work, the non-purely-
technical areas have not received much attention in the past. 
For example, how to make SECIA more credible to assessors 
and how to overcome communication and coordination 
problems remain greatly unexplored. From the answers to 
RQ1 and RQ2 and from the insights provided in related 
work, we suggest the following future focus areas:  
• Development of traceability guidelines, including 
heuristics for deciding upon suitable granularity and 
trace semantics for SECIA 
• Identification of the artefact types for which tracea-
bility-related SECIA challenges are most often faced 
• Establishment of the degree to which SECIA can, or 
should, be automated as a way to tackle tool sup-
port-related challenges, while conforming to certifi-
cation authorities’ expectations and tool qualification 
requirements. 
• Safety cases in SECIA, for analysing change impact 
both from and on safety cases 
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  Fig. 12. Frequency of SECIA improvement areas 
20 PREPRINT - ACCEPTED FOR IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, 2016 
 
4.4 Summary of Results and of Implications 
SECIA seems to be most frequently addressed (RQ1) as a 
consequence of the Modification of a new system during its 
development, and triggered by changes in Design Specifications, 
Requirements Specifications, Safety Analysis Results, Source 
Code, Test Case Specifications, and Traceability Specifications. The 
artefact type most frequently affected by changes is Manual 
V&V results. In general, Requirements specifications can be 
regarded as the most central artefact type for SECIA.  
Some less frequent phenomena require more research ef-
fort, including practices for which very few systematic 
means for SECIA exist (e.g., re-certification for a different 
application domain) and practices critical for ensuring sys-
tem safety and demonstrating compliance with safety stand-
ards (e.g., changes in and verification of assumptions and 
operation conditions). Among the possible concerns about 
the current SECIA practices, industry should analyse wheth-
er safety case evolution is being properly addressed. Practi-
tioners must be aware that SECIA can be necessary in a wide 
variety of situations and involve any artefact type. Security 
aspects are already considered when performing SECIA.  
Sixty-nine strong SECIA-related correlations exist be-
tween the artefact types, and all the artefact types have some 
strong correlation. Six very strong correlations were found 
between Requirements Specifications and Design Specifications 
(two very strong correlations), Requirements Specifications and 
Source Code, Test Case Specifications and Source Code, Safety 
Analysis Results and Assumptions and Operation Conditions 
Specifications, and between components or instances of Source 
Code. These results suggest that SECIA usually affects several 
artefact types and that the artefact types usually evolve to-
gether. Practitioners should pay special attention to the pos-
sible change impacts between strongly or very strongly cor-
related artefact types; see Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. Software devel-
opers and maintainers must carefully analyse possible ripple 
effects from Source Code evolution, and its impact on system 
safety. Some relationships between artefact types that the 
correlations represent, and their implications for SECIA, 
require further investigation (e.g., the relationships of 
Manual V&V Results with other artefact types). 
Regarding tool support (RQ2), the overall level of SECIA 
automation is low and practitioners perform a significant 
amount of manual work. Only the median of Source Code is 
above “decision support available”. We report 98 different 
tools used for SECIA in practice and that practitioners com-
monly use internal tools and basic tools such as Excel and 
Word (which have some clear limitations, e.g., no tool quali-
fication). No commercial tool is widely used in industry for 
SECIA or used for all artefact types, and the tools seem to 
vary among the organizations. The amount of “fully manu-
al” work is even more surprising if we consider the tools 
with some search functionality (e.g., Excel) that practitioners 
could use. Current SECIA practices also include the use of 
model-based tools and tailored extensions. A question re-
mains if industry has a greater need for solutions that inte-
grate safety evidence information from different tools than 
new SECIA tools for specific artefact types. Both product 
developers and tool vendors could take advantage of the 
design of tool chains for SECIA, which should further ad-
dress traceability needs. 
Practitioners face a wide variety of challenges for SECIA 
(RQ3), with Insufficient tool support having the highest medi-
an frequency. Indeed, Tool support is the area where the high-
est ratio of respondents indicated potential SECIA improve-
ments. Nonetheless, most of the respondents mentioned 
Information aspects in their SECIA improvement suggestions, 
TABLE 6 
IMPROVEMENT AREAS THAT COULD MITIGATE SECIA CHALLENGES 
Challenge Improvement Area 
Insufficient tool support Tool aspects 
Difficulty in estimating the effort required to manage a change Guidance, Data used for analysis, Communication, Training, Analysis process 
Vast number of artefacts to trace Guidance, Data used for analysis, Tool aspects 
Too coarse granularity of the traceability between artefacts to accurately 
know the consequences of a change 
Guidance, Data used for analysis, Analysis process, Tool 
aspects 
Insufficient traceability between artefacts to accurately know the 
consequences of a change 
Guidance, Data used for analysis, Analysis process, Tool 
aspects 
Difficulty in determining the effect of a change on system safety Guidance, Training, Analysis of impact on safety 
Long time for evaluating the consequences of a change Data used for analysis, Knowledge, Analysis process 
Difficulty in assessing system-level impact of component reuse Guidance, Training, System development, Analysis process, Tool support 
Unclear meaning of the traceability between artefacts in order to know 
how to manage a change 
Guidance, Data used for analysis, Analysis process, Tool 
aspects 
Insufficient confidence by assessor or certifiers in having managed a 
change properly 
Communication, SECIA process transparency, System V&V, 
Analysis process, SECIA verification process, Tool aspects 
Lack of a systematic process for performing impact analysis Guidance, Analysis process, Tool support 
Difficulty in deciding if a component can be reused Guidance, Training, System development, Analysis process, Tool support 
Excessive detail of the traceability between artefacts, making traceability 
management more complex than necessary for impact analysis purposes 
Guidance, Data used for analysis, Analysis process, Tool 
aspects 
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and almost half of them referred to Process aspects. We identi-
fied and classified 22 improvement areas, and only three 
correspond to Tool Aspects, see Fig. 11. Relationships can be 
established between the challenges and the improvement 
areas, see Table 6. Based on the results, industry often fails to 
fulfil SECIA traceability needs. SECIA could also benefit 
from a wider knowledge of safety goals in development and 
maintenance teams. Finally, neither experience nor the level 
of SECIA automation seem to greatly help practitioners in 
reducing the frequency of the challenges, and social aspects 
(e.g., communication and coordination) should be consid-
ered for improving SECIA.  
5 CONCLUSION 
Safety evidence change impact analysis (SECIA) is essential 
for any safety-critical system. It is not only recommended in 
most safety standards, but its inadequate management has 
contributed to accidents or near-accidents. New insights into 
how practitioners deal with SECIA are necessary in order to 
determine what aspects must be carefully considered in 
practice and to identify improvement opportunities. 
This paper presents an industrial survey on SECIA. The 
results provide a comprehensive picture of the circumstanc-
es under which SECIA is addressed, the tool support used, 
and the challenges faced. Further, the survey identifies as-
pects that practitioners should carefully consider when per-
forming SECIA but which are not mentioned in the text of 
safety standards, such as that certain artefact types usually 
co-evolve (see Fig. 5), tools that can be used for SECIA (see 
Section 4.2.1), and possible improvement areas (see Fig. 11). 
The survey results suggest that most practitioners deal 
with SECIA during system development and mainly from 
system specifications. Most survey respondents have per-
formed SECIA in a wide variety of situations and changes in 
the body of safety evidence seem to usually affect several 
artefact types. Tool support is used in industry for all artefact 
types, but there appear to be many improvement opportuni-
ties. The level of automation in the process is low and insuf-
ficient tool support is the most frequent challenge. Nonethe-
less, SECIA might further benefit from improvements on 
information aspects rather than on tools aspects. 
The results confirm insights provided in prior research. 
For example, requirements specifications appear to play a 
major role in SECIA, and practitioners expect improvements 
in tool support. Nonetheless, this survey is the first study 
that provides strong empirical evidence of how often the 
phenomena occur. More importantly, the results report on 
phenomena for which no evidence existed (e.g., use of inter-
nal tools for SECIA from all the artefact types studied), and 
suggest frequencies of phenomena in industry that were 
very likely unexpected (e.g., re-certification for different 
application domains) or that can raise some concerns about 
current industrial practices (e.g., safety case evolution man-
agement seems to often be inadequate). 
In terms of software maintenance, we expect that our 
findings can help software developers gain further aware-
ness and understanding of the need for carefully analysing 
the safety implications of software changes. Although no 
strong evidence of co-evolution of source code and safety-
targeted artefact types was found, software safety risks and 
how software contributes to system safety are prime con-
cerns in many application domains. 
Several areas for future research can be identified from 
the results. Some examples are the study of SECIA needs for 
safety-targeted artefact types, the analysis of how tools such 
as Excel and Word are used for SECIA, and the definition of 
effective and efficient guidelines for tackling traceability-
related SECIA challenges. Furthermore, the results highlight 
several aspects where industry could clearly benefit from 
improvements, such as tools that support SECIA for any 
artefact type and an increase in their level of automation. 
Some aspects that have not been addressed in the survey 
(e.g., a deeper study of SECIA activities and their level of 
automation) could also trigger future work. 
The survey represents a significant milestone for other re-
search in which we are currently involved, including cross-
domain and evolutionary safety assurance and certification 
[13], component-based impact analysis [70], and recommen-
dation-driven impact analysis [6] for critical systems. The 
results of the survey help us to identify directions for future 
work.  
We plan to further investigate the potential relationships 
between different artefact types and their implications for 
impact analysis, how to improve safety case evolution man-
agement, and technologies for integrating safety evidence 
information from different sources. Finally, we would like to 
complement the survey results with insights from case stud-
ies in which we further analyse SECIA practices in specific 
companies or projects. 
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APPENDIX A. QUESTIONNAIRE
This appendix presents the questionnaire used as survey 
instrument. The questions with an asterisk indicate that 
they required an answer, the ‘PR’ sign indicates that the 
order of the corresponding page was randomized, and 
the ‘OR’ sign in the questions indicates that the order of 
the options to answer about was randomized (e.g., the 
order of the artefact types in Q11). 
 
 
SURVEY ON SAFETY EVIDENCE CHANGE IMPACT 
ANALYSIS FOR CRITICAL SYSTEMS 
 
Introduction 
 
Most critical computer-based and software-intensive 
systems in domains such as avionics, railway, and auto-
motive are subject to some form of safety assessment by a 
third party (e.g., a certification authority) as a way to 
ensure that these systems do not pose undue risks to 
people, property, or the environment. The most common 
type of assessment is compliance with safety (or safety-
related) standards, usually referred to as safety certifica-
tion. Examples of safety standards include the general 
IEC61508 standard for electrical/electronic/                 
programmable electronic devices in a wide range of in-
dustries, and more specific standards such as DO-178C 
for avionics, the CENELEC standards for railway, and 
ISO26262 for the automotive sector. 
Demonstration of compliance with a specific standard 
involves gathering and providing convincing safety evi-
dence. By safety evidence, we refer to the artefacts that 
contribute to developing confidence in the safe opera-
tion of a system and that are used to show the fulfil-
ment of the criteria of a safety standard. Examples of 
artefact types that can be used as evidence include safety 
analysis results, testing results, reviews, and source code. 
Such artefacts can evolve during the system lifecycle. 
The corresponding changes must be managed and change 
impact analysis might be necessary in order to guarantee 
that the changes do not jeopardise system safety or com-
pliance with a standard. By safety evidence change im-
pact analysis, we refer to the activity that attempts to 
identify, in the body of safety evidence, the potential 
consequences of a change. Possible consequences can be 
the need for adding, modifying, or revoking some arte-
fact. 
The purpose of this survey is to gain insights into how 
industry deals with safety evidence change impact 
analysis. The survey is part of the work in OPENCOSS 
(http://www.opencoss-project.eu/), a European research 
project that is developing an open-source infrastructure 
for safety assurance and certification of critical systems. 
Your answers will help us to develop solutions that fit the 
current practices and needs regarding safety evidence 
change. 
The survey is targeted at practitioners that are or have 
been involved in safety evidence change impact analy-
sis. This includes people who provide safety evidence 
(e.g., safety engineers or testers of a company that sup-
plies components), people who check safety evidence 
(e.g., an independent safety assessor), and people who 
request safety evidence (e.g., a person that represents a 
certification authority).  
Completing the survey is expected to take less than 20 
minutes. Please answer the questions in the context of the 
projects targeted at developing a safety-critical system in 
which you have participated. All the responses will be 
held confidential and anonymous.  
Finally, if you are interested in the results of the survey, 
please contact Jose Luis de la Vara (jdelavara@simula.no) 
or Markus Borg (markus.borg@cs.lth.se). 
Thank you very much for your participation in the 
survey. 
 
 
Background information 
 
1. How did you find this survey? * 
- Post on LinkedIn 
- Post on a mailing list 
- Personal invitation 
- Other - please specify: 
 
2. What is the main application domain in which you 
have worked on safety evidence change impact analy-
sis? * 
- Aerospace 
- Automotive 
- Avionics 
- Defence 
- Machinery 
- Maritime 
- Medical 
- Mining 
- Nuclear 
- Off-highway equipment 
- Oil and gas 
- Process automation 
- Railway 
- Robotics 
- Trucks 
- Other - please specify: 
 
3. In relation to what safety standards have you been 
involved in safety evidence change impact analysis? * 
 
 
4. In what country or countries have you principally 
worked upon safety evidence change impact analysis? * 
 
 
5. What is the main role of the organization for which 
you have worked regarding the development of safety-
critical systems? * 
- Certification authority 
- Component supplier 
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- Consultant 
- Developer/manufacturer of final systems 
- Development tool vendor 
- Independent safety assessor 
- Regulation authority 
- System user 
- Research institution 
- Other - please specify: 
 
6. What is your main role in the organization? * 
 
 
7. How long have you been involved in activities re-
lated to safety evidence change impact analysis? * 
- Less than 1 year 
- Between 1 and 2 years 
- Between 2 and 5 years 
- Between 5 and 10 years 
- More than 10 years 
 
8. How many projects dealing with safety evidence 
change impact analysis have you participated in? * 
- Less than 5 projects 
- Between 5 and 10 projects 
- More than 10 projects 
 
 
Circumstances under which safety evidence change 
impact analysis is addressed (PR) 
 
Safety evidence change impact analysis might be per-
formed in different scenarios and for different artefact 
types used as safety evidence. You will be asked about 
these aspects in this section. 
 
9. How often have you been involved in safety evi-
dence change impact analysis in these general situa-
tions? *(OR) 
Frequency: 
- Never 
- Few projects (i.e., rarely) 
- Some projects (i.e., sometimes) 
- Most of the projects (i.e., very often) 
- Every project (i.e., always) 
Situations: 
- Reuse of existing components in a new system 
- Modification of a new system during its develop-
ment 
- Modification of a new system as a result of its verifi-
cation and validation 
- Modification of a system during its maintenance 
- New safety-related request from an assessor or a cer-
tification authority 
- Re-certification of an existing system after some 
modification 
- Re-certification of an existing system for a different 
operational context 
- Re-certification of an existing system for a different 
standard 
- Re-certification of an existing system for a different 
application domain 
 
10. If you would like to add any further general situa-
tions in which you have been involved in safety evi-
dence change impact analysis, please do so in the box 
below, and also indicate their frequency (for example, 
Situation X: some projects; Situation Y: few projects, 
etc.) 
 
 
11. For the artefacts used as safety evidence, how of-
ten is safety evidence change impact analysis performed 
as a consequence of changes in the following artefact 
types? *(OR) 
Frequency: 
- Never 
- Few projects 
- Some projects 
- Most of the projects 
- Every project 
- I don’t know 
Artefact types: 
- System Lifecycle Plans (e.g., development plans, val-
idation and verification plans, modification proce-
dures, and operation procedures) 
- Reused Components Information (e.g., historical 
service data and reliability specifications) 
- Personnel Competence Specifications (e.g., person-
nel training and experience assessment) 
- Safety Analysis Results (e.g., the results from Fault 
Tree Analysis and Failure Mode and Effects Analy-
sis) 
- Assumptions and Operation Conditions Specifica-
tions (e.g., the constraints on the working environ-
ment of a system) 
- Requirements Specifications (e.g., safety require-
ments or performance requirements) 
- Architecture Specifications (e.g., system components 
and AADL diagrams) 
- Design Specifications (e.g., the internal characteris-
tics of system components and SysML diagrams) 
- Traceability Specifications (e.g., the relationships be-
tween requirements and test cases and between re-
quirements and design) 
- Test Case Specifications (e.g., the inputs, execution 
conditions, and predicted results using a system) 
- Tool Supported Validation and Verification Results 
(e.g., testing results, simulation results, and formal 
verification results) 
- Manual Validation and Verification Results (e.g., in-
spection results and review results) 
- Source Code (e.g., Ada code or C code) 
- Safety Cases (documented argument aimed at 
providing a compelling, comprehensive, and valid 
case that a system is safe for a given application in a 
given operating environment) 
 
12. If you would like to add any further artefact types 
from which safety evidence change impact analysis is 
performed, please do so in the box below, and also indi-
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cate their frequency (for example, Artefact type X: some 
projects; Artefact type Y: few projects, etc.) 
 
 
13. For the artefacts used as safety evidence, how of-
ten are the following artefact types affected by changes 
to the body of safety evidence? *(OR) 
Frequency: 
- Never 
- Few projects 
- Some projects 
- Most of the projects 
- Every project 
- I don’t know 
Artefact types: 
- System Lifecycle Plans 
- Reused Components Information 
- Personnel Competence Specifications 
- Safety Analysis Results 
- Assumptions and Operation Conditions Specifica-
tions 
- Requirements Specifications 
- Architecture Specifications 
- Design Specifications 
- Traceability Specifications 
- Test Case Specifications 
- Tool Supported Validation and Verification Results 
- Manual Validation and Verification Results 
- Source Code 
- Safety Cases 
 
14. If you would like to add any further artefact types 
affected by changes to the body of safety evidence, 
please do so in the box below, and also indicate their 
frequency (for example, Artefact type X: some projects; 
Artefact type Y: few projects, etc.) 
 
 
 
Tool support (PR) 
 
Tools can support and facilitate safety evidence change 
impact analysis. Such tools can vary depending on the 
artefact types from which the analysis originates. For 
example, an organization can use some change impact 
analysis tool for requirements or for source code. It is also 
usually necessary to show how the change, its conse-
quences, and the actions to address the consequences 
have been managed. We refer to this information as evi-
dence of safety evidence change management. Such in-
formation might be stored in some tool. You will be asked 
about these aspects in this section. 
 
15. For the artefacts used as safety evidence, please 
rank the level of automation offered by the tool support 
used for performing an impact analysis when the fol-
lowing artefact types change. *(OR) 
Levels of automation: 
- Fully manual (no automation in the process; e.g., impact 
determined by reading documentation and asking col-
leagues) 
- Decision support available (limited support for narrow-
ing down a selection of possible impact; e.g., search tool 
used to seek impact, repositories easy to browse thanks to 
information structure) 
- Semi-automated recommendations (tools suggest arte-
facts that might be impacted but humans must confirm) 
- Highly automated recommendations (tools report im-
pact and humans have the authority to veto the sugges-
tions)  
- Automatic impact analysis (tools determine the impact 
without human involvement) 
- I don’t know 
Artefact types: 
- System Lifecycle Plans (e.g., development plans, val-
idation and verification plans, modification proce-
dures, and operation procedures) 
- Reused Components Information (e.g., historical 
service data and reliability specifications) 
- Personnel Competence Specifications (e.g., person-
nel training and experience assessment) 
- Safety Analysis Results (e.g., the results from Fault 
Tree Analysis and Failure Mode and Effects Analy-
sis) 
- Assumptions and Operation Conditions Specifica-
tions (e.g., the constraints on the working environ-
ment of a system) 
- Requirements Specifications (e.g., safety require-
ments or performance requirements) 
- Architecture Specifications (e.g., system components 
and AADL diagrams) 
- Design Specifications (e.g., the internal characteris-
tics of system components and SysML diagrams) 
- Traceability Specifications (e.g., the relationships be-
tween requirements and test cases and between re-
quirements and design) 
- Test Case Specifications (e.g., the inputs, execution 
conditions, and predicted results using a system) 
- Tool Supported Validation and Verification Results 
(e.g., testing results, simulation results, and formal 
verification results) 
- Manual Validation and Verification Results (e.g., in-
spection results and review results) 
- Source Code (e.g., Ada code or C code) 
- Safety Cases (documented argument aimed at 
providing a compelling, comprehensive, and valid 
case that a system is safe for a given application in a 
given operating environment) 
 
16. If you would like to add any further artefact types 
and the level of automation for performing an impact 
analysis when they change, please do so in the box be-
low (for example, Artefact type X: fully manual; Artefact 
type Y: semi-automated recommendations, etc.) 
 
 
17. For the artefacts used as safety evidence, please 
indicate the name of the tools that are used for perform-
ing an impact analysis when the following artefact 
types change. If it is a tool developed internally in some 
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organization, please indicate “Internal tool”. If you do 
not know the tools, please leave the corresponding box-
es empty. (OR) 
System Lifecycle Plans  
Reused Components Information  
Personnel Competence Specifications  
Safety Analysis Results  
Assumptions and Operation Condi-
tions Specifications 
 
Requirements Specifications  
Architecture Specifications  
Design Specifications  
Traceability Specifications  
Test Case Specifications  
Tool Supported Validation and Verifi-
cation Results 
 
Manual Validation and Verification 
Results 
 
Source Code  
Safety Cases  
 
18. If you would like to add any further artefact types 
and the tools that are used for performing an impact 
analysis when they change, please do so in the box be-
low (for example, Artefact type X: tool W; Artefact type 
Y: tool Z, etc.) 
 
 
19. What tools are used to store the evidence of safety 
evidence change management? If you do not know the 
tools, please indicate "I don't know". * 
 
 
 
Challenges (PR) 
 
When dealing with safety evidence change impact 
analysis, different challenges can arise and thus hinder 
this activity. Implicitly, this means that some improve-
ment opportunities exist. You will be asked about these 
aspects in this section. 
 
20. How often have you faced or observed the follow-
ing challenges regarding safety evidence change impact 
analysis? *(OR) 
Frequency: 
- Never 
- Few projects (i.e., rarely) 
- Some projects (i.e., sometimes) 
- Most of the projects (i.e., very often) 
- Every project (i.e., always) 
Challenges: 
- Difficulty in estimating the effort required to manage 
a change 
- Too coarse granularity of the traceability between ar-
tefacts to accurately know the consequences of a 
change 
- Excessive detail of the traceability between artefacts, 
making traceability management more complex than 
necessary for impact analysis purposes 
- Unclear meaning of the traceability between arte-
facts in order to know how to manage a change 
- Insufficient traceability between artefacts to accu-
rately know the consequences of a change  
- Long time for evaluating the consequences of a 
change 
- Insufficient confidence by assessor or certifiers in 
having managed a change properly 
- Vast number of artefacts to trace 
- Insufficient tool support 
- Lack of a systematic process for performing impact 
analysis 
- Difficulty in determining the effect of a change on 
system safety 
- Difficulty in deciding if a component can be reused 
- Difficulty in assessing system-level impact of com-
ponent reuse 
 
21. If you would like to add any further challenges, 
please do so in the box below, and also indicate their 
frequency (for example Challenge X: every project, very 
important; Challenge Y: few projects, moderately im-
portant, etc.)  
 
 
22. How do you think that safety evidence change 
impact analysis could be improved? * 
 
 
 
Follow-up studies 
 
23. Please provide the following information if you 
are interested in participating in follow-up studies.  
Name  
Organization  
Email  
 
APPENDIX B. EXAMPLE OF CORRELATION 
CALCULATION 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficient is used to 
measure the association between two ordinal variables (X 
and Y). For situations where there are many tied scores, as 
in our survey, the coefficient can be calculated with the 
following formula [60]:  
where:  
• The rank for the subjects with tied scores is the 
average of their ranks 
• ‘x’ is the difference between the rank of each 
score on X and the mean rank of these scores 
(X−X ) 
• ‘y’ is the difference between the rank of each 
score on Y and the mean rank of these scores 
corr. = ∑x
2 +∑y2 −∑d2
2 ∑x2∑y2
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(Y−Y ) 
• ‘d’ is the difference between the rank of each pair 
of scores on X and Y of a same subject ( X−Y ) 
As an example, the value of the correlation between 
Requirements Specifications (X) and Traceability Specifications 
(Y) regarding how often SECIA was performed as a con-
sequence of changes in these artefact types (Q11) is 0.7. It 
is calculated as follows: 
• The responses to consider correspond to those that 
provided an answer different to “I don’t know” 
about both how often Requirements Specifications 
and how often Traceability Specifications were 
SECIA triggers (77 responses) 
• For Requirements Specifications, 3 respondents an-
swered “Never”, 6 “Few projects”, 20 “Some pro-
jects”, 18 “Most projects”, and 30 “Every project”. 
The rank for “Never” is 2, for “Few projects” is 6.5, 
for “Some projects” is 19.5, for “Most projects” is 
38.5, and for “Every project” is 62.5. 
• For Traceability Specifications, 8 respondents an-
swered “Never”, 17 “Few projects”, 10 “Some pro-
jects”, 19 “Most projects”, and 23 “Every project”. 
The rank for “Never” is 4.5, for “Few projects” is 
17, for “Some projects” is 30.5, for “Most projects” 
is 45, and for “Every project” is 66. 
• The mean rank for both Requirements Specifications 
and Traceability Specifications is 39. 
• The value of ∑x2  is 34621.5, of ∑y2  is 35923.5, 
and of ∑d2 is 20918.5 
APPENDIX C. VALUES OF THE SPEARMAN RANK-
ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
Tables A1, A2, and A3 show the values of the Spearman’s 
rank-order correlation coefficient for the strong and very 
strong correlations found between artefact types (the 
three tables) and for each artefact type with itself (Table 
A3). The p-values of these correlations are below 1e-08. 
APPENDIX D. TOOLS DESCRIPTION 
Table A4 presents the main purpose of each commercial 
tool reported by the respondents of the survey as used for 
SECIA and shown in Fig. 7, Fig. 8, or in Fig. 9. The web-
sites were accessed on Sep 27, 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A1 
STRONG AND VERY STRONG CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ARTEFACT TYPES AS SECIA TRIGGERS. THE CELLS OF THE VERY 
STRONG CORRELATIONS ARE SHADED. 
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Assumptions and Operation 
Conditions Specifications      0.61 0.75  0.6     
Architecture Specifications        0.61    0.64  
Design Specifications  0.72  0.61  0.71    0.78     
Manual V&V Results    0.63           
Personnel Competence Specs.              
Requirements Specifications 0.7  0.71  0.82         
Reused Components Information    0.65  0.6        
Safety Analysis Results      0.6        
Safety Cases   0.6           
Source Code 0.68  0.75           
System Lifecycle Plans  0.64            
Test Case Specifications 0.7             
Tool-Supported V&V Results              
 
corr. = 34621.5+ 35923.5− 20918.5
2 34621.5×35923.5
= 0.70359894 ≈ 0.70
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TABLE A2 
STRONG AND VERY STRONG CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ARTEFACT TYPES AS AFFECTED BY CHANGES. THE CELLS OF THE 
VERY STRONG CORRELATIONS ARE SHADED. 
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Assumptions and Operation 
Conditions Specifications    0.6  0.61 0.62 0.69 0.68   0.62 0.64 
Architecture Specifications        0.66 0.68   0.72  
Design Specifications  0.71  0.67 0.67 0.74    0.78  0.64   
Manual V&V Results  0.73  0.68  0.69         
Personnel Competence Specs.              
Requirements Specifications 0.68  0.71  0.69 0.61 0.62       
Reused Components Information              
Safety Analysis Results      0.74        
Safety Cases              
Source Code 0.69  0.7           
System Lifecycle Plans              
Test Case Specifications 0.65             
Tool-Supported V&V Results              
 
TABLE A3 
STRONG AND VERY STRONG CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ARTEFACT TYPES AS SECIA TRIGGERS (TOP ROW) AND AS AFFECTED 
BY CHANGES (LEFTMOST COLUMN). THE CELLS OF THE VERY STRONG CORRELATIONS ARE SHADED. 
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Assumptions and Operation 
Conditions Specifications              0.68 
Architecture Specifications       0.62        
Design Specifications      0.67    0.63      
Manual V&V Results  0.63  0.65  0.72          
Personnel Competence Specs.      0.61    0.67     
Requirements Specifications     0.67    0.66      
Reused Components Info.        0.63  0.7     
Safety Analysis Results       0.61  0.6     0.62 
Safety Cases               
Source Code     0.76    0.64      
System Lifecycle Plans    0.64 0.66     0.67  0.6   
Test Case Specifications         0.6      
Tool-Supported V&V Results  0.64             
Traceability Specifications 0.67    0.64          
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TABLE A4 
TOOLS USED FOR SECIA 
Tool Description 
Apex https://apex.oracle.com/i/index.html Web-based software development environment 
Artisan Studio http://www.atego.com/products/atego-modeler/ System modelling tool 
ASCE http://www.adelard.com/asce/choosing-asce/index.html Tool for the development and management of assurance cases and safety cases 
Clearcase http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/clearcase Software configuration management tool 
Clearquest http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/clearquest 
Configuration management tool 
Dimensions 
http://www.serena.com/index.php/en/products/featured-products/dimensions-cm/   
overview/ 
Configuration management tool 
DOORS http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/ratidoor Requirements management tool 
Eclipse http://www.eclipse.org Integrated development environment 
Excel http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/excel/ Spreadsheet application 
LDRA Testbed http://www.ldra.com/en/testbed-tbvision Static and dynamic analysis tool 
Office http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/ Office suite 
PVCS http://www.serena.com/index.php/en/products/other-products/pvcs-pro/ Version management tool 
Reqtify 
http://www.3ds.com/products-services/catia/capabilities/systems-
engineering/requirements-engineering/reqtify/ 
Requirements and systems engineering tool 
RequisitePro http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/downloads/r/rrp/ Requirements management tool 
Rhapsody http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/ratirhapfami Collaborative software and system development tool 
Simulink http://www.mathworks.se/products/simulink/ Tool for multi-domain simulation and model-based design 
SVN https://subversion.apache.org Software versioning and revision control system 
Synergy http://www-03.ibm.com/software/products/en/ratisyne Configuration management tool 
Teamcenter http://www.plm.automation.siemens.com/en_us/products/teamcenter/ Product lifecycle management tool 
TFS http://www.visualstudio.com/products/tfs-overview-vs Source code management tool 
VeroTrace http://www.verocel.com/products/requirements-traceability/ Requirements management and lifecycle traceability tool 
Visio http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/visio/ Diagram creation tool 
Word http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/word/ Word processor 
 
